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CROSS-BORDER HEALTH CARE IN THE EU AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH CARE
SYSTEMS OF THE MEMBER STATES: THE DYNAMICS
RESULTING FROM THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
JUSTICE'S DECISIONS ON FREE MOVEMENT AND
COMPETITION LAW
JOHAN W. VAN DE GRONDEN
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the influence of European Union (EU) law
on the organization of national health care of the Member States. On the
one hand, Article 152(5) of the European Convention (EC) stipulates that
the organization and delivery of health care is considered to be a respon-
sibility of the Member States on a national level. On the other hand, it is
clear from landmark European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions that the
Treaty provisions concerning free movement do cover national laws on
health care schemes. This paper will look at how the health care systems
of the Member States are affected by EU law on the internal market and
competition in order to determine whether or not the way European in-
ternal market and competition law is applied to cross-border health care
amounts to a harmonization of the national health care systems of the EU
Member States.
Free movement rules have more influence on national health
care systems than EU competition law does. The role of competition law
is less important because many (public) bodies managing health care sys-
tems are not regarded as undertakings. However, according to settled
ECJ case law, health services themselves do constitute economic activi-
ties and are, as a consequence, covered by the EU regime on free move-
ment. With regard to non-hospital care, patients are free to choose be-
tween domestic and foreign providers. As for hospital care, Member
States are forced to manage their systems properly, e.g., taking into ac-
count the interests of patients (e.g., no waiting lists, international medical
standards, etc.). If they succeed in paying due consideration to these in-
terests, the Member States are allowed to restrict the free movement of
hospital services.
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By examining whether the health authorities have managed their
systems properly, the ECJ is setting standards for: reimbursement rates,
waiting lists, and prior authorization procedures on a case-by-case basis.
This approach leads inevitably to the harmonization of several aspects of
the organization of the national health care systems of the Member
States. From a patient's perspective, it could be argued that the ECJ case
law forces the national authorities to respect principles of good-
governance, while managing the national health care system. Therefore,
the ECJ's approach should be welcomed.
Nevertheless, the steering capacity of the national authorities
must be respected. Consequently, in the near future, points of concern
will be the observance of the principle of subsidiarity in national health
care and the planning of the national health care systems, which remain
tasks of the Member States on a national level. Hopefully, the draft Di-
rective on Patient Mobility will be capable of striking a good balance be-
tween the internal market and the national organization of health care.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of the present issue of the Wisconsin International Law
Journal is to explore issues of cross-border health care. Patients seeking
health care abroad may create various problems for Member States (for
instance, difficulties related to the need to plan health care services).
This paper will focus on cross-border health care services in the Euro-
pean Union (EU).
To start with, it must be noted that in the EU, the subject of
cross-border health care is a delicate matter. On the one hand, it is a well
known fact that one of the main objectives of the European Union is the
establishment of an internal market. As a result, the treaties establishing
the EU1 lay down provisions that obligate Member States not to impede
upon the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital, and
prohibit undertakings from distorting competition. Moreover, EU law
has supremacy over national legislation according to settled European
The EU Treaty and the EC Treaty will be changed by the Treaty of Lisbon. See Treaty of Lisbon
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 10, 42 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. However, the basic
provisions of free movement and competition will not be changed by the Treaty of Lisbon. In
this regard, it should be noted that the EC Treaty is to be renamed 'Treaty on the functioning of
the European Union' (TFEU).
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Court of Justice (ECJ) case law.2 On the other hand, pursuant to Article
152(5) of the European Community, the organization and delivery of
health care is considered to fall under the purview of the Member States.
Consequently, national law, rather than EU law, deals with the manage-
ment of health care systems and sets out which treatments patients are
entitled to. As a result, a diagonal tension exists between objectives re-
lated to the internal market and the national laws governing health care?
Therefore, it is clear from the outset that in the EU, issues of cross-
border health care amount to a delicate interplay between the role of the
Member States and that of the EU.
In many cases, it is difficult and sometimes nearly impossible, to
draw a distinction between elements of the internal market and features
connected with the organization and the delivery of health care. Ulti-
mately, the provision of health care services is closely intertwined with
economic activities, which implies that the EU internal market and com-
petition law comes into play. It is clear from landmark decisions (such
as Kohll v. Union des caisses de maladie4 and Decker v. Caisse de mala-
die des employ~s), that it is precisely for these reasons that the ECJ has
taken the view that the Treaty provisions in the field of free movement
do cover national laws on health care schemes. In cases involving cross-
border health care, the ECJ applied those Treaty provisions to the organi-
zation of national health care systems, and, in doing so, it served a blow
to the national health authorities. Since Kohll and Decker, the concerned
national authorities now know that they have to give consideration to EU
law. In other words, the health care systems of the EU Member States
are in limbo just because two Luxembourg citizens sought medical care
abroad, one by trying to purchase glasses in Belgium (Decker) and the
other dental services in Germany (Kohll).
In light of the aforementioned discussion, the question arises as
to how these systems are affected by EU law on the internal market and
competition. In particular, it must be asked if the application of Euro-
pean internal market and competition law to cross-border health care
amounts to a harmonizing of the national health care systems of EU
Member States. Are Member States forced to align their national health
2 See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 586; Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Trans-
port-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastin-
gen, 1963 E.C.R. 1,2 [hereinafter Van Gend & Loos].
3 See, e.g., Costa, 1964 E.C.R. at 587; Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 2-3.
Case C-158/96, Kohil v. Union des Caisses de Maladie, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1931.
Case C-120/95, Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employ6s Priv~s, 1998 E.C.R. 1-183 1.
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care systems with requirements developed at the EU level, despite the
fact that Article 152(5) of the EC preserves the organization and delivery
of health care to them? This paper addresses these questions by focusing
on the influence of EU law on the organization of national and cross-
border health care.
At the heart of this paper is the discussion of EU law on the in-
ternal market and on competition. The internal market regime encom-
passes both the EC Treaty provisions on free movement and EU harmo-
nization measures taken by the European Community legislature. Since,
in the case of cross-border health care, the landmark decisions of the ECJ
deal mainly with free movement, the emphasis of this paper is on the
analysis of that regime. EU competition law consists of rules directed at
undertakings and rules directed at Member States.
Part I of this paper discusses the impact of the internal market
law-most notably the provisions of free movement of the EC Treaty-
on the national health care systems of the Member States. Part II deals
with competition law and health care. This section examines whether
EU competition rules give rise to cross-border health care and, as a re-
sult, puts pressure on the Member States' organization of health care.
Part III of this article concludes by considering whether the EU internal
market and competition law forces Member States to harmonize their
health care schemes.
I. EU INTERNAL MARKET LAW AND CROSS-BORDER
HEALTH CARE
The ECJ judgments in Kohll and Decker are important starting
points in the case law with regard to cross-border health care. In decid-
ing those cases, the ECJ began setting out the principles that would go-
vern cross-border health care in the EU. The Court based these prin-
ciples primarily on the Treaty provision of the free movement of services
(Article 49 and further EC Treaty). Therefore, this section will first dis-
cuss the case law setting forth the principles for cross-border health care.
More recent ECJ rulings elaborate on these two landmark deci-
sions by formulating rules which aim to facilitate cross-border care.
Hence, the second and third subsections of Part I will discuss the case
law providing these "facilitating rules." Then, Part I will address the
harmonization measures that are relevant for cross-border care and which
might influence the organization of national health care schemes.
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The EC Treaty (EC) establishes provisions that prohibit Member
States from restricting the free movement of persons, goods, services,
and capital. Articles 49 to 55 of the EC in particular deal with the free
circulation of services, whereas Articles 28 to 30 of the EC concerns the
free movement of goods (non-tariff barriers). Articles 43 to 48 of the EC
govern the freedom of establishment, whereas the free movement of per-
sons is subject to Articles 39 to 42 of the EC. Finally, the provisions on
the free movement of capital are laid down in Articles 56 to 60 of the
EC.
Both distinctly and indistinctly, applicable national measures are
prohibited under EU law. It could be argued that the ECJ applies a mar-
ket access test: 6  national measures rendering the access of persons,
goods, services, or capital coming from other Member States to the na-
tional market less attractive, fall within the scope of the prohibitions laid
down in the Treaty provisions on free movement.7
Restrictions can be justified by exceptions established in the EC
Treaty. Such exceptions include Article 46 of the EC (which inter alia
refers to public health) and Article 30 of the EC (which inter alia covers
the protection of health and life of humans), or as developed in the case
law of the ECJ8 (overriding requirements of general interest and is also
referred to as the Rule of Reason).'
A national measure can only be exempted from the scope of a
free movement prohibition if it meets the principle of proportionality. In
this regard, in most cases, the ECJ deploys the test of the less restrictive
means by examining whether the objective of general interest could also
be realized by means that would make free movement less restrictive
than the national measure concerned.
6 See, e.g., Case C-302/97, Konle v. Austria, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099; Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Con-
siglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165; Case C-415/93,
Union Royale Beige des Soci&ts de Football Ass'n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921
[hereinafter Bosman]; and Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financi~n, 1995
E.C.R. 1-1141.
7 See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 801-03,
831-34 (4th ed. 2008).
8 See, e.g., Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein (Cassis
de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649.
9 See, e.g., JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 467 (5th 2006).
Vol. 26, No. 3
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A. THE FIRST GENERATION CASE LAW ON FREE MOVEMENT AND
HEALTH CARE: SETTING THE PRINCIPLES
The first generation of case law on cross-border health care may
be considered from the perspective of the landmark decisions in Kohll, °
Decker," Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and Peerbooms v.
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen2 (Smit-Peerbooms), and V.G.
Miiller-Faur v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekerin-
gen UA, and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO
Zorgverzekeringen"3 (Miiller-Faur,). It was in these cases that the prin-
ciples for receiving health care services (and goods) from providers es-
tablished in other Member States were set.
B. HEALTH CARE AND THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY PROVISIONS ON
FREE MOVEMENT
In Kohll and Decker, the ECJ held that the fact that national rules
governing cross-border health care fall within the category of social se-
curity regulations does not exclude them from the scope of the Treaty
provisions on free movement. 4 The court held that since health care ser-
vices (and goods) are usually provided for remuneration, they should be
considered services within the meaning of Article 50 (and as goods in the
sense of Article 28). In these cases, the ECJ built upon earlier rulings in
which different kinds of health care services were regarded as economic
activities.
In Smit-Peerbooms and Miiller-Faur , the proper functioning of
health care systems was at stake, which meant that the ECJ was again
asked to examine carefully to what extent the EC Treaty provisions on
the free movement of services were applicable. Both cases concerned
the Dutch health care system that was in place during that time. Under
that particular system, reimbursement for treatment abroad was subject to
IS Kohl], 1998 E.C.R. 1-1931.
Decker, 1998 E.C.R. 1-1831.
12 Case C-157/99, B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5473 [here-
inafter Smits-Peerbooms].
"3 Case C-385/99, Miiller-Faur6 v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen,
2003 E.C.R. 1-4509.
14 See Kohll, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1943, paras. 20-21; Decker, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1845, paras. 23-25.
' See, e.g., Case C-159/90, Soc'y for the Prot. of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. v. Grogan, 1991 E.C.R.
1-4685 [hereinafter Grogan]; Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, Luisi and Carbone v. Ministero del
Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R. 377.
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prior authorization by the sickness fund 6 the patient was affiliated with.
The Dutch health care scheme involved a benefit-in-kind system: pa-
tients were entitled to receive health services only from providers with
which their sickness fund had entered into agreements in advance.' 7 At
issue were medical treatments of Dutch patients in other Member States.
Without any hesitation, the ECJ ruled that according to its own
settled case law, medical activities fall within the scope of the Treaty
provisions on free movement.' 8 It stated that the fact that hospital care is
financed by sickness funds on the basis of agreements and pre-set scales
does not remove the treatment from the sphere of services within the
meaning of Article 50 of the EC.'9 The Court also held that it did not
matter that the national health care scheme at issue provided for benefits-
in-kind rather than reimbursement. Furthermore, the Court pointed out
that both treatments inside and outside hospitals are covered by the EU
regime on free movement.
In Watts,2" the ECJ confirmed its rulings in Smits-Peerbooms and
Miiller-Faur6. However, it also differentiated its line of reason in a sub-
tle way. In Watts, a British patient associated with the United King-
dom's National Health Services (NHS) sought hospital treatment in
France for a hip replacement. In Watts, the ECJ repeated its previous
holding that medical care provided for remuneration falls under the EU
provisions on free movement. 2' The Court also held that refusal by a
NHS entity to pay the costs connected with this treatment was covered
by the Treaty provisions on free movement. The ECJ stressed the point
that these provisions were applicable because Mrs. Watts went to another
Member State in order to receive medical treatment there. The ECJ felt
that there was no need to determine whether the provision of hospital
services in the context of the British NHS, in itself constitutes services
within the meaning of Article 50 of the EC. The cross-border aspects of
the hospital service concerned were enough to establish the applicability
of the EU rules on free movement.2
16 This term is quite common in Europe, it is equivalent to the term "public insurance companies"
in the United States.
'7 See Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5473, paras. 3-24.
I8 ld. paras. 53-59.
'9 Id. para. 56.
20 Case C-372/04, Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4325.
2' Id. paras. 86-92.
22 Id. para. 90.
Vol. 26, No. 3
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According to the approach of the ECJ deployed in Watts, the
provision of health care services can be disconnected from the state body
that administers the service. The service itself may constitute a "service"
in the sense of Article 50, whereas the administering body does not fall
within the scope of that provision. This implies that institutions manag-
ing national health care systems or other social security systems could
restrict the free movement of services without themselves providing ser-
vices covered by the EC Treaty.
A similar conclusion could be drawn from the ECJ's decision in
Freskot.23 In the Freskot case the benefits provided by a Greek social se-
curity system institution were not considered "services" within the mean-
ing of Article 50 of the EC. However, the compulsory affiliation with
the social security scheme managed by this institution restricted the free
movement of services, provided that the benefits concerned constituted
an insurable activity.24 According to the ECJ, the health care services
concerned were insurable, if foreign insurance companies were able to
offer insurance similar to the insurance provided by the Greek social se-
curity scheme at issue against the risks in question.25 Consequently, the
Court felt that it could not be ruled out that compulsory social security
systems that do not leave any room for competition could fall within the
scope of the Treaty provisions on free movement. The key question is
whether they relate to insurable benefits.
On the one hand, the Freskot judgment makes clear that these
Treaty provisions are capable of interfering with the Member States'
powers to regulate social security in a rather far-reaching way: from a
free movement perspective, many compulsory social security schemes
could give rise to restrictions. On the other hand, it is rather remarkable
that in both academic circles and legal practice not much attention is paid
to this judgment. This article advances the view that the debate should
focus on both the consequences of the free movement rules for health
care and the effects for other social security schemes. Case law such as
Watts and Freskot demonstrates that these rules could open up social se-
curity arrangements.
23 Case C-355/00, Freskot AE v. Dimosio, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5263.
24 Id. paras. 61-63.
25 Id. paras. 53, 62.
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1. THE PROHIBITION FROM RESTRICTING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF
HEALTH CARE SERVICES
In the landmark decisions on free movement and health care, the
ECJ was asked to rule on the compatibility of national systems requiring
prior authorizations for cross-border care with EU law. The national re-
quirements obliging patients to apply for prior authorizations for treat-
ments abroad were modeled in different ways.
In Luxemburg (Kohll and Decker), national legislation stipulated
that the costs related to health services received in other EU Member
States were only reimbursed if the patient's sickness fund had granted
prior authorization for the services rendered. In the Netherlands (Smits-
Peerbooms and Miiller-Faur6), the benefit-in-kind system implicitly
forced patients to request their sickness funds in advance to cover the
costs of medical treatment in other Member States, as these sickness
funds usually only purchase health care from providers established in the
Netherlands. In the United Kingdom (UK), national legislation regulat-
ing the NHS imposes on the state the duty to provide the necessary med-
ical health care. Hospital care is provided free of charge by the NHS or-
gans, on a non-profit-making basis. As a result, patients were free to go
to hospitals in other Member States, but could not receive medical treat-
ment there at the expense of the NHS; whereas if they had received
treatment in British hospitals, it would have been free of charge.
Unsurprisingly, the ECJ ruled that the explicit prior authorization
scheme in Luxemburg restricted the free movement of services.26 In EU
law, such a national discriminatory measure is not in line with the prohi-
bition against hindering free movement. However, other Member States,
like the Netherlands,27 claimed that their systems were different and that,
therefore, the Kohll and Decker rulings had no significant consequence
when applied to their systems. They stressed that the need of patients to
apply for prior authorization for medical treatment abroad was "merely
the result" of the structure of their national health system.2" As a result,
they argued, their national health care system did not fall under the pro-
hibition not to restrict the free movement of services.
26 See Kohl], 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1946, paras. 33-35; Decker, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-1852-52, paras. 34-36.
27 See, e.g., Press Release, Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Sport of the Netherlands, Arresten Eu-
ropees hof Hebben Weinig Gevolgen voor Ziektekostenverzekeringen [European Court Rulings
Have Little Effect on Health Insurance] (Sept. 18, 1998), available at
http://www.minvws.nl/persberichten/z/arresten_europees hof hebben-weinig-gevolgenvoor-z
iektekostenverzekeringen.asp.
28 Cf Miiller-Faur&, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4553, para. 29.
Vol 26, No. 3
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The ECJ rejected these arguments in Smits-Peerbooms, Miiller-
Faur6 and Watts. In Smits-Peerbooms and Miiller-Faur , which con-
cerned the Dutch health care scheme that was in place then, the ECJ
ruled that the benefit-in-kind system amounted to a restriction of the free
movement of hospital services, as prior authorization was only granted if
the necessary medical treatment could not be provided by the hospitals
under contract in the Netherlands.29 Moreover, the ECJ felt that the
Dutch government's argument that sickness funds could enter into
agreements with hospitals established in other Member States, could not
be upheld. After all, these entities mainly had contractual arrangements
with hospitals operating within the territory of the Netherlands.3" There-
fore, the ECJ was of the opinion that the Dutch system deterred or even
prevented insured persons from receiving medical treatment abroad. In
Watts, the receipt of free hospital treatment did not depend upon prior
authorization when provided by a British hospital, but such an authoriza-
tion was required when provided by a hospital established in another
Member State. The ECJ held that this led to a restriction of free move-
ment of services. Apparently, it did not matter to the ECJ whether this
restriction was inherent to the NHS system. What was important was
that this system prevented patients from seeking treatment in other
Member States.
The position taken by some Member States is not helpful. They
argue that their health care system is different than the systems that are at
stake in well known judgments of the ECJ. As long as a national sys-
tem-explicitly or implicitly-requires prior authorization for medical
treatment in other Member States or for reimbursement of the costs in-
curred by such treatment, the ECJ assumes that free movement is ham-
pered. As a result, the only way a Member State can go unaffected by
this significant development in EU law on free movement would be for it
to attempt to argue that its policies regarding prior authorization fall un-
der an exception.
2. EXCEPTIONS AND CROSS-BORDER HEALTH CARE
In the aforementioned case law, the ECJ accepted that restric-
tions to cross-border health care could be justified, if certain conditions
29 See Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. at 1-5530-33, paras. 62-71; Miller-Faur&, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-
4557-58, paras. 41-45.
30 See Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. at 1-5531, para. 66; Miiller-Faur6, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4557,
para. 43.
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are met. In this regard, the ECJ based its line of reasoning both on Ar-
ticle 46 of the EC (a Treaty exception) and on the Rule of Reason (an ex-
ception developed in the case law of the ECJ). 1 Restrictions to the free
movement of health services may be justified either by the need to pro-
tect public health (EC Article 46) or the need to maintain the financial
balance of a social security system.
Essentially, the ECJ has based its approach on a distinction be-
tween hospital care and non-hospital care (so-called "intramural" and
"extramural" care). Most notably in Miiller-Faur , it became clear that
Member States are not allowed to apply a prior authorization requirement
to non-hospital care (e.g., services provided by medical self-employed
professionals) but they may maintain such requirements with respect to
hospital care. Accordingly, the ECJ has adopted a rather generous ap-
proach towards hospital care by allowing far-reaching restrictions on the
free movement of services provided in a hospital.32
In the author's view, the main reason for this difference is that,
according to the ECJ, hospital care needs to be subject to an advanced
system of planning in order to ensure that a Member State is able to op-
erate a network of hospitals covering its whole territory. In the words of
the ECJ, ". . . the survival of the population. . . " of a Member State is
even dependent on such a network, as the maintenance of treatment ca-
pacity or medical competence is essential for the public health.3 In con-
trast, the ECJ held that the removal of the requirement of prior authoriza-
tion for non-hospital care would not give rise to an enormous increase of
patients traveling to other Member States and, consequently, such a re-
moval would not put the financial balance of the social national security
system under pressure.34 The ECJ took the view that problems related to
the cultural, linguistic, and geographical distance would prevent patients
from crossing the borders of the Member States in large numbers in order
to seek treatment by self-employed professionals. Thus, according to the
ECJ, non-hospital care does not need to be subject of a system of plan-
ning.
The result of this perspective is that the national health care sys-
tems of Member States are liberalized in as far as they concern medical
treatment provided outside hospitals. The national legal barriers to this
"' See, e.g., Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5533-34, paras. 73-75.
32 Karl St6ger, The Freedom of Establishment and the Market Access of Hospital Operators, 17
EUR. Bus. L. REv. 1545, 1555 (2006).
33 Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. at 1-5533, para. 74.
34 Miller-Faur6, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4573, para. 95.
Vol. 26, No. 3
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health care category have been removed by the ECJ. Although Article
152(5) of the EC provides that national competences regarding the or-
ganization and the delivery of health care should be respected, the free
movement EC Treaty provisions have considerable a impact, at least on
the way non-hospital services are organized and delivered: the ECJ case
law has led to a certain degree of harmonization of these "extramural"
services in the EU.
The distinction between hospital and non-hospital care is of great
importance. In some cases, this distinction is hard to draw, but the ECJ
seems to be prepared to give a broad interpretation to the concept non-
hospital care.35 In Miiller-Faure, the ECJ stated that certain services pro-
vided in a hospital environment are also capable of being provided by a
practitioner in his surgery or in a health center. These services could,
therefore, be placed on equal footing with non-hospital services.36
It should be noted that the ECJ has not given a carte blanche to
the Member States to regulate hospital services. The landmark decisions
analyzed above do formulate several criteria that national health care au-
thorities must comply with in order to prevent patients from being treated
abroad. A successful invocation of a Treaty exception or Rule of Reason
exception depends largely on the question whether the principle of pro-
portionality has been observed.37 Remarkably, while formulating the
conditions connected with the justification of the restrictions of the free
movement of hospital services, the ECJ did not explicitly refer to this
principle. However, it is clear from the outset that these conditions are
based on the presumption that a prior authorization requirement-from a
EU law perspective, a far-reaching curtailment of the free movement
services-is only justifiable if this requirement is proportionate.
The ECJ held that two conditions must be met. First, the waiting
list for the hospital where the patient is seeking treatment must not be too
long. The assessment of the question of the duration of such a list may
only be based on medical considerations,38 and not on costs related ar-
guments.39 Second, the necessity of the medical treatment must be eva-
luated on the basis of international (and not national) medical standards."n
35 Anne Pieter van der Mei, Cross-Border Access to Medical Care: Non-Hospital Care and Wait-
ing Lists, 31 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 57,65 (2004).
36 Miiller-Faur6, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4567, para. 75.
37 The principle of proportionality is explained in Part I.A.
38 See, e.g., Mfiller-Faur&, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4571, para. 90.
39 See, e.g., Watts, 2006 E.C.R. at 14416, paras. 120-22.
40 See Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. at 1-5539, para. 97.
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It must be examined whether this treatment is sufficiently tried and tested
by international and medical science.
It is apparent from these conditions that the case law on the Trea-
ty provisions on free movement affects the organization and delivery of
hospital care. Although this conclusion is burdensome for some Member
States,41 the considerable influence of EU law on cross-border health care
cannot be denied. The case law forces Member States to solve capacity
problems occurring in their hospitals. If they do not do so, they could be
confronted with a flow of patients traveling to hospitals in other Member
States. Such a development is capable of endangering the proper func-
tioning of the planning system that is in place in the health care sector of
a Member State. Furthermore, while assessing the necessity of hospital
treatment, the competent health authorities must pay due consideration to
the international state of science. As soon as a certain medical practice is
accepted by a considerable number of professionals in several countries,
this practice can no longer be rejected by a Member State.
Accordingly, the conditions requiring Member States to provide
treatment in due course, and to assess the necessity of this treatment in
light of international medical standards, enable EU law to intervene in
the organization of hospital care in the Member States. They provide a
basis on which an elaborative and detailed set of rules could be built
upon. This is exactly what the ECJ did in its rulings subsequent to its
earlier judgments.42
C. THE SECOND GENERATION CASE LAW ON FREE MOVEMENT AND
HEALTH CARE: SETTING THE RULES AIMING TO FACILITATE CROSS-
BORDER HEALTH CARE
After determining the main principles for cross-border health
care in the EU, the ECJ was asked to clarify how these principles must
be applied in practice. By elaborating on its landmark decisions, the ECJ
has extended its influence on national health schemes.
In this respect, it must be noted that no clear dividing line exists
between the ECJ's case law establishing the "cross-border health care
41 For example, the U.K. claims that it is still possible that restrictions to non-hospitals are justifia-
ble in the view of the ECJ. See HEALTH AND CONSUMER PROTECTION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL,
EUROPEAN COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF THE RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION
REGARDING "COMMUNITY ACTION ON HEALTH SERVICES" (2007) at 15 [hereinafter SUMMARY
REPORT], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/healthlphoverview/co-Operation/mobility/docs/health-services-rep-en.pdf
42 See, e.g., Smits-Peerbooms, 2001 E.C.R. at 1-5539-40, paras. 94-98.
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principles" and the case law which is presently being referred to, in
which these principles are worked out in detail. The demarcation be-
tween these categories of case law is somewhat blurred. Nevertheless, it
is useful to make a distinction between these categories, as each type of
case law gives rise to different questions.
With regard to several issues, the ECJ explained in more detail
how Member States have to deal with cross-border health care in the EU.
These topics are discussed below. It should also be noted that what is
put forward with regard to these topics, only holds true if the Treaty pro-
visions on free movement confer upon a patient the right to receive med-
ical treatment abroad.
1. REIMBURSEMENT RATES
Once it is established that a patient is entitled to receive cross-
border health care pursuant to the Treaty provisions on free movement, it
must be determined to what extent the managing body of the home state
must pay the costs connected with this cross-border service. ECJ deci-
sions on this matter could deeply interfere with the health care services
of the Member States. However, these questions involving reimburse-
ment rates must be tackled in order to ensure that patients can benefit
from the rights they derive from the EU free movement regime.
In Miiller-Faur6, the ECJ stated that it is up to the Member
States to determine the reimbursement rates and to fix the amounts to be
paid to patients. 3 As a result, the ECJ put forward that ". . . insured per-
sons who go without prior authorization to a Member State other than the
one in which their sickness fund is established to receive treatment there
can claim reimbursement of the cost of the treatment received only with-
in the limits of the cover provided by the sickness insurance scheme of
the Member State of affiliation." This gave Ms. Miiller-Faur& a Pyr-
rhus' victory, because pursuant to the applicable Dutch rules, insurance
coverage contributed only up to a maximum of EUR 221.03, whereas the
costs incurred for the treatment by a German dentist were EUR
3,806.35. 5 At the end of the day, she had to bear most of the costs (and
this after being involved in litigation for more than eight years).
43 See Miller-Faur, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4576, paras. 105-07.
Id. at para. 106. See also Elies Steyger, National Health Care Systems Under Fire (but not too
heavily), 29 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 97, 105 (2002).
43 See Mifller-Faur6, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4509, para. 106.
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However, in Miiller-Faur6, the ECJ also formulated conditions
to be fulfilled by the Member States when shaping their reimbursement
rates. National rules regarding these rates must be based on objective,
non-discriminatory, and transparent criteria.46 By stressing the impor-
tance of these criteria, the ECJ has given itself the opportunity to influ-
ence the way national health care systems are financed.
This is apparent from the Vanbraekel decision.47 In that case, a
Belgian patient residing in Belgium was treated in a hospital in France.
According to French legislation, she was forced to pay her own contribu-
tion for the medical treatment. However, in Belgium, similar treatment
was free of charge. The ECJ felt that there was no doubt that the free
movement of services was restricted in this case, since the patient re-
ceived a lower level of coverage when she was treated in another Mem-
ber State's hospital than she would have received had she undergone
similar treatment in one of her home state's hospitals. Moreover, she
was prevented from applying for services offered by providers estab-
lished in other Member States.
The ECJ decided that this restriction was not justifiable, as the
financial equilibrium of the Belgian health care system was not at stake.48
After all, the patient was entitled to receive hospital treatment abroad an-
yway and, as a consequence, the payment of an additional reimburse-
ment, covering the difference between the systems of cover in France
and Belgium, would not jeopardize the maintenance of a network of hos-
pital services.
As a result, in Vanbraekel it was accepted that the EU regime on
free movement not only entitled EU nationals to receive medical treat-
ment in other Member States, but it was also capable of interfering with
the national rules on the financing of health care treatment.
The question of reimbursement was very complicated in cases
where a EU national sought medical treatment in a Member State that
based its health care system on principles that were considerably dissimi-
lar to the principles of the health care system of the Member State of res-
idence. As a consequence, the question arose: how to connect these na-
tional systems? In Watts, a British patient underwent an operation in a
French hospital. One of the questions that needed to be answered by the
ECJ was the amount of the costs that the British authorities must pay to
46 Id. at 1-4576, para. 107.
17 Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel v. Alliance Nationale des Mutualit~s Chr~tiennes, 2001 E.C.R. 1-
5363.
48 Id. para. 51.
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Ms. Watts. In France, a health insurance-like system is in place (caisses
mutuelles), while in the UK, patients registered with NHS receive treat-
ment free of charge.49 Once it was established that the costs incurred by
Ms. Watts in France must be reimbursed, the amount of this reimburse-
ment had to be determined.
The ECJ had to express its view on the situation, in which the
French health care legislation did not provide for the reimbursement in
full of the cost of the hospital treatment concerned. Like the Vanbrakel
case, at issue was the question of how the home Member State should
deal with reimbursement requests of patients who were obliged to make
additional payments under the health care system of the host Member
State.
In the author's view, in the Watts case it was more difficult to
cope with this question given the dissimilarities between the French and
British health care systems than it was in Vanbrakel, where the French
and Belgian systems were more alike. The ECJ has developed an ap-
proach based on the presumption that the patient must be placed in the
position he would have been in had he undergone the operation under the
British NHS. In the author's view, the rationale of this approach is the
non-discrimination principle: a patient who is entitled to an operation in
another Member State pursuant to EU law should not be treated less fa-
vorably than a patient who undergoes similar treatment in the home
Member State."
According to the ECJ, the NHS was obliged to compensate Ms.
Watts for the additional payment she made, to a certain extent. 1 The
competent authority must reimburse the patient the difference between
the cost, objectively quantified, of the equivalent treatment under the
NHS system, up to the total amount invoiced for the treatment received
in the host Member State (in this case, France), and the amount that the
competent Member State institution has paid on behalf of the NHS,52 in
so far as the first amount is larger than the second.
" See Watts, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4365, paras. 5-23.
so See also TAMARA K. HERVEY & JEAN V. MCHALE, HEALTH LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
134 (2004).
51 See Watts, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4365, para. 131.
52 The competent authority of the host Member State reimburses the cost of the medical treatment
of a patient affiliated with the health care system of the home Member State. Subsequently, the
host Member State will pass on these costs to the home Member State. See Council Regulation
1408/71 on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed Persons and Their Families
Moving within the Community, 1971 O.J. (L 149) 2 (EEC) [hereinafter Council Regulation
1408/71].
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Consequently, the ECJ forces the two Member States involved to
carry out a comparative analysis of the costs. The host Member State is
allowed to limit the total reimbursed amount to the level of the costs of
the health care services of its own system, provided that these costs are
objectively calculated. As a result, when the costs of the operation that
Ms. Watts underwent in France are higher than the costs of a similar op-
eration in a British hospital, the NHS was not obliged to compensate Ms.
Watts completely for the additional payments made by her to the French
authorities.
However, the Watts case shows that the Member States' rules on
reimbursement rates are influenced by EU law. In the case of cross-
border health care, Member States might be forced to come up with
comparative analyses of the costs of different health care systems in Eu-
rope. The direct result of such analysis could be that additional pay-
ments made by patients when being treated abroad must be compensated.
What is more, it is possible that the Watts case law-possibly leading to
the benchmarking of several health care systems in Europe-would sti-
mulate Member States to reconsider the cost efficiency of their health
care services.
Another cost issue arose in relation to accommodation and trav-
eling. Ms. Watts claimed that her travel and accommodation costs had to
be reimbursed by the NHS. It is clear from the outset that patients seek-
ing medical treatment abroad are confronted with considerable ancillary
costs. However, these costs could cause problems for the national health
authorities as well, since they have to control the expenditure on health
care. Similar to the question of additional payment, the ECJ's approach
towards this issue is based on the anti-discrimination principle. Whether
such expenditure is covered depends upon the way the national health
care systems involved deal with ancillary costs, such as travel and ac-
commodation expenses.53 A Member State is only required to reimburse
these costs if similar costs are also reimbursed for treatments offered un-
der its own health care system. If a national health care scheme does not
provide for the reimbursement of costs, such as travel and accommoda-
tion expenses, that Member State is not required to compensate patients
seeking medical treatment in another Member State for those costs. As a
result, once a Member States has opted for a health care scheme that in-
cludes several ancillary costs, the amount of such expenditure could be-
come even larger, when many insured persons from another Member
13 See Watts, 2006 E.C.R. at 1-4366, paras. 139-40.
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State cross the border in order to receive health care services. In con-
trast, if a Member State has excluded these costs from its health care
scheme, it will not be confronted with the same expense when insured
persons seek medical treatment abroad. Consequently, one could argue
that the ECJ's "anti-discriminatory approach" actually contains an incen-
tive to exclude ancillary costs from national health care systems.
The ECJ's approach towards ancillary costs in Watts is in line
with its previous judgment in the Leichtle case." There, the ECJ stressed
that it is up to the Member States to limit the amount up to which ex-
penditures on board, lodging, travel, visitors' tax, and the completion of
a final medical report could be reimbursed." However, if those costs are
reimbursed for treatment provided under the health care system of the
home Member State, the competent authorities of that state must also
compensate patients undergoing similar treatment in another Member
State for these costs.5 6
2. PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS REGULATING THE GRANTING OF
PRIOR AUTHORIZATIONS
In the case of hospital care (intramural care) the Member States
are allowed to make cross-border health care subject to prior authoriza-
tion. As long as Member States are able to provide the necessary hospit-
al care to the patient without undue delay, they may even refuse to grant
authorization for cross-border care.
However, in judgments delivered after Smits-Peerbooms, where
it was accepted that the free movement of hospital services may be re-
stricted by a prior authorization scheme, the ECJ formulated conditions
to be met by such schemes. Consequently, the way the Member States
model their authorization schemes in health care is partly influenced by
EU law.57
Already in Miiller-Faur6, the ECJ set some principles regarding
the design of these schemes. It was stressed that a scheme of prior au-
thorization cannot legitimize discretionary decisions taken by public bo-
54 Case C-8/02, Leichtle v. Bundesanstalt fir Arbeit, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2641.
55 Id. para. 48.
56 Id. paras. 48-50.
57 See also Panos Koutrakos, Healthcare as an Economic Service under EC Law, in SOCIAL
WELFARE AND EU LAW 117 (Michael Dougan & Eleanor Spaventa eds., 2005).
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dies of the Member States. 8 Therefore, such a scheme must be based on
objective and non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance.
These criteria should circumscribe the exercise of the national authori-
ties' discretion and prevent the arbitrary use of power. 9 Furthermore, the
procedural system at hand must be easily accessible and lead to decisions
that may be challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. In mak-
ing their decisions, the health care authorities must take into considera-
tion all of the circumstances surrounding each case: both aspects related
to the patient's medical condition, including the degree of pain or nature
of the patient's disability, and his/her medical history.
In Inizan,6° the ECJ further built upon the procedural principles it
laid down in Miiller-Faur6. In Inizan, it was held that a request made by
a patient for authorization in order to receive hospital care in another
Member State must be dealt with objectively and impartially within a
reasonable time, whereas a refusal to grant authorization must be subject
to a procedure of judicial review.6' In other words, the procedures relat-
ing to cross-border health care must meet fair trial like prerequisites.62
Health care authorities must not only assess requests made by patients
without any prejudice, but they must also proceed in handling these re-
quests in a timely manner. In addition, the procedures themselves may
not last too long.
In the author's opinion, the requirements concerning the speed of
the procedure should be explained against the background of the ECJ's
ruling that the free movement of hospital care may only be limited when
the medical treatment that the patient needs can be given without undue
delay. It goes without saying that the treatment cannot be given in a
timely fashion when the prior authorization procedure is too time-
consuming.
Furthermore, in Inizan, the ECJ decided that refusals to grant au-
thorization, or advice on which these refusals are based, must refer to the
58 Miuller-Faur6, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4569, para. 84. For ECJ's settled case law on the matter, see,
e.g., Joined Cases C-358 & C-416/93, Criminal Proceedings against Aldo Bordessa, 1995 E.C.R.
1-361 and Case C-205/99, Asociaci6n Profesional de Empresas Navieras de Lineas Regulares v.
Administraci6n General del Estado, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1271 [hereinafter Analir].
59 Miller-Faur6, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-4569, para. 85.
60 Case C-56/01, Inizan v. Caisse Primaire d'Assurance Maladie des Hauts-de-Seine, 2003 E.C.R.
1-12403.
61 Id. para. 48.
62 See also Anthony Dawes, Bonjour Herr Doctor': National Healthcare Systems, the Internal
Market and Cross-border Medical Care within the European Union, 33 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 167, 170 (2006).
Vol. 26, No. 3
HeinOnline  -- 26 Wis. Int'l L.J. 723 2008-2009
Wisconsin International Law Journal
specific provisions on which they are based.63 These decisions must be
well reasoned too, whereas the judicial bodies competent to review re-
fusals to grant authorizations must be able to commission the advice of
wholly objective, impartial, and independent experts. 64 As a result, it
could be argued that, as was the case in Inizan, principles of good gover-
nance are developed for the health care sectors of the Member States.
Hence, next to substantive rules regulating cross-border health care,
principles forcing the Member States to design health care procedures
properly are derived from the Treaty provisions on free movement.
In Watts, the ECJ applied these principles to the British NHS.
The procedure of this national system was criticized because the regula-
tions issued by the NHS do not set out criteria for the grant or refusal of
prior authorization.65 This deficit was described by the ECJ as a "lack of
a legal framework"66 (in the prior authorization procedure). Furthermore,
the ECJ pointed out that the decision to grant or refuse authorization may
not be merely based on the existence of waiting lists. The patient's med-
ical condition must be taken into account too.67 Accordingly, general ob-
servations related to the health care system of the Member State involved
should not only play a role in the assessment carried out by the authori-
ties, but arguments regarding the health of the patient applying for prior
authorization must also be accommodated in the reasoning upon which
the grant or the refusal of such an authorization is based.
3. NATIONAL POLICIES REGARDING WAITING LISTS
Waiting lists play an important role in the rulings of the ECJ.
The free movement of hospital services may be restricted in order to
maintain medical treatment capacity, in so far as the patient concerned
does not need to wait too long for her or his treatment. However, in
Watts the ECJ accepted that the national health authorities deploy wait-
ing lists because they have to cope with the rising demand for hospital
care and budgetary constraints. 68 It is clear from the outset that the bo-
dies responsible for the provision of health care must be able to manage
63 Inizan, 2003 E.C.R. at 1-12441, para. 49.
64 Id.
63 Watts, 2006 E.C.R. at 1-4415, para. 118.
66 id.
67 Id. para. 63.
68 Id. para. 67.
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the supply of medical services by setting priorities on the basis of the
available resources and capacities.
However, in Watts the ECJ also formulated conditions that na-
tional policies regarding waiting lists must comply with.69 First, a pa-
tient's waiting time may not exceed the period that is acceptable in the
light of his/her clinical needs.7" The question of whether a person can be
treated without undue delay must only be assessed on the basis of medi-
cal arguments and may not be based on an economic line of reasoning.7'
Second, the waiting list must be set in a flexible and dynamic way, be-
cause the period of time the patient is initially told he or she will have to
wait must be reconsidered if his or her state of health so requires.72
In cases in which a patient seeks hospital care in other Member
States, it appears that waiting lists are not contrary to EU law. Nonethe-
less, the Member States' policies in regards to these lists must observe
principles of good governance. The medical needs of the patients should
be at the heart of the hospitals' waiting list policies.
4. THE PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
HOSPITALS
In many EU Member States, people are not only treated in public
hospitals but also in private hospitals. Therefore, the question arises
whether the costs of treatments carried out by private hospitals in other
Member States must be reimbursed. The ECJ addressed this question in
Stamatelaki.73
According to the Greek legislation at issue in Stamatelaki, a pa-
tient affiliated with a Greek social security institution was entitled to
hospital care provided by both domestic public and private hospitals free
of charge. However, if he or she was treated in another Member State,
her or his costs were only reimbursed when she or he had undergone the
treatment in a public hospital. Services provided by private hospitals in
69 See id. paras. 68-71.
70 Id. para. 68.
71 See also CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS 398 (2d ed. 2007).
72 See Watts, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4365, paras. 69-71.
73 Case C-444/05, Stamatelaki v. NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation, 2007
E.C.R. 1-3185.
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other Member States did not fall within the scope of the coverage of the
Greek health care system except for children under the age of fourteen.74
In the view of the ECJ, such a health care system precluded in-
sured persons from seeking medical treatment in other Member States
and, as a consequence, amounted to restricting the free movement of ser-
vices.75 Furthermore, in the view of the ECJ, this restriction was not jus-
tifiable, as the principle of proportionality was not met. The ECJ felt that
the absolute terms of the prohibition laid down in the Greek legislation
were not appropriate to the objective pursued. 76 What is more, the ECJ
rejected the Greek government's argument that the quality of foreign pri-
vate hospitals could not be monitored by Greek health care authorities.77
The ECJ pointed out that private institutions established in other Member
States are subject to quality controls, just like the Greek institutions,
whereas doctors of these foreign hospitals must comply with the applica-
ble EU rules on medical professional skills.78 Consequently, the Greek
authorities had to recognize the inspections on quality carried out in oth-
er Member States and the national health laws (partly implementing EU
directives on the free movement of doctors) of these Member States.
In Stamatelaki, the ECJ based its approach towards the reim-
bursement of costs of treatment in foreign private hospitals on the prin-
ciple of anti-discrimination. These costs must be paid back only by the
national health care authorities, if the cost of medical treatment under-
gone in a similar private domestic institution falls within the scope of the
coverage of the national health care schemes. Therefore, it is up to the
Member States to decide on the question of the reimbursement of the
costs of services provided by private hospitals. But, as soon as the reim-
bursement of these costs is part of their own health care system, they
cannot totally exclude the recovery of the costs connected with treatment
in private hospitals in other Member States.79 If the necessary hospital
treatment cannot be given without undue delay by domestic hospitals, the
Member States are obliged to compensate the costs of the treatment
abroad, irrespective of whether this treatment was offered by a public or
74 Id. paras. 4-8.
75 Id. paras. 25-28.
76 Id. para. 35.
77 Id. paras. 36-37.
78 Id.
79 In this respect, see also H.M. Stergiou, "Kalimera' dear Doctor: het arrest-Stamatelaki en an-
dere recente ontwikkelingen op het terrein van grensoverschrydende patientenmobiliteit, II
NEDERLANDS TUDSCHRIFT VOOR EROPEES RECHT [DUTCH ILLUSTRATED MAGAZrNE FOR
EUROPEAN LAW] 238, 242 (Nov. 2007).
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private institution. Furthermore, the Member States must trust the in-
spections on quality and the standards of the national health laws of their
fellow Member States.
5. THE PATIENTS ENTITLED TO HEALTH CARE BENEFITS
On April 1, 2008 the ECJ rendered its judgment in the case
Regering van de Franse Gemeenschap, Waalse regering v. Vlaamse
regering." In that case, the ECJ addressed the question of whether EU
law requires Member States to insure certain groups of persons. Similar
to the case law on reimbursement rates and on the provision of health
care by private hospitals, the ECJ based its approach towards this ques-
tion on the principle of non-discrimination.8" The point of departure was
that nationals of other Member States may not be treated less favorably
than nationals of the Member State concerned.
In the case Regering van de Franse Gemeenschap, Waalse re-
gering v. Vlaamse regering, the scheme for insurance of persons whose
autonomy is reduced,82 introduced by the autonomous Flemish communi-
ty (a federal entity of Belgium), was at stake. According to this program,
only persons working and residing in Flanders and persons working in
Flanders but residing in Member States other than Belgium were insured.
As a consequence, persons working in Flanders, but residing in other
parts of Belgium (i.e., the Walloon and German areas of Belgium) were
excluded from the scheme at issue.83
The ECJ explicitly stated that the free movement provisions of
the EC Treaty were not applicable to purely internal situations.84 There-
fore, Belgian nationals working in Flanders and residing in the Walloon
and German regions of Belgium could not invoke the Treaty provisions
on the free movement of persons (Articles 39 and 43 of the EC). How-
ever, the situation was different for nationals of other Member States
who work in Flanders and are residents in the other parts of Belgium.
The ECJ ruled that it is possible for them to rely on the EU free move-
ment rules.85
8 Case C-212/06, Regering van de Franse Gemeenschap v. Vlaamse Regering, 2008 E.C.R. -
(Apr. 1, 2008), 2008 O.J. (C 128) 4.
81 Id. paras. 47-48.
82 In this case, the ECJ used this term to describe people living with disabilities.
83 Id. paras. 7-1I.
84 Id. para. 38.
85 Id. paras. 41-42.
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What is more, in the view of the ECJ, the Flemish scheme at
stake had the effect of causing the nationals of other Member States to
lose social security advantages. After all, if they lived in Belgian regions
other than Flanders and decided to pursue employment or self-
employment in Flanders, they were not able to claim the benefits of the
Flemish scheme of care insurance. According to the ECJ, this fact was
capable of impeding the exercise of the rights conferred by Articles 39
and 43 of the EC. Consequently, the Flemish health care insurance
scheme was found in violation of these Treaty provisions.86
Remarkably, Belgium did not invoke an exception in order to
justify the restriction of free movement. Rather, it only argued that ac-
cording to the requirements inherent in the division of powers within the
Belgian federal structure, the Flemish government was not competent to
introduce health care schemes for persons living in other regions of Bel-
gium. The ECJ did not accept this argument. In doing so, it referred to
long standing and settled case law, which prevent Member States from
basing their argument on practices that result from the constitutional or-
ganization to justify non-compliance with obligations arising under EU
law.
87
From this judgment it is apparent that Member States are obliged
to grant to other Member States' nationals health care benefits similar to
those that their own nationals are entitled to. Even if certain groups of
their own nationals are excluded from these benefits, nationals of other
Member States may not be denied access to the benefits concerned.
Thus, EU law is capable of requiring Member States to extend the scope
of national health care schemes.
D. SPECIAL SECOND GENERATION CASE LAW ON FREE MOVEMENT
AND HEALTH CARE: RULINGS ON PATIENT MOBILITY AND SOCIAL
SECURITY REGULATION
The rulings discussed above specify the rights of various catego-
ries of patients but, quite remarkably, the ECJ did not make use of the
Social Security Regulation,88 while setting the main principles for cross-
border care. Yet, this piece of Community legislation also contains pro-
visions on cross-border health care. Thus, after having set the main prin-
86 Id. para. 54.
87 Id. para. 58.
88 Council Regulation 1408/71, supra note 52.
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ciples on the basis of provisions of the EC Treaty regarding free move-
ment, the ECJ turned not only to these provisions but also to the Social
Security Regulation, while elaborating on the rights of patient to receive
access to health care in other Member States.
The relevant framework for cross-border health is founded in Ar-
ticle 22 of the Social Security Regulation.89 According to Article
22(1)(a), a worker who stays outside his or her state of residence has the
right to be treated in another Member State if his or her condition neces-
sitates this medical treatment. Pursuant to Article 22(l)(c), health care
authorities may give a patient authorization to go to the territory of
another Member State in order to receive medical treatment. Article
22(2) stipulates that such an authorization may not be refused where the
treatment cannot be provided in the state of residence.
In Inizan and Watts, discussed above, the ECJ based its rulings
not only on the Treaty provisions on free movement, but also on these
provisions of the Social Security Regulation. The ECJ judgment in Kel-
ler is noteworthy.9" In Keller, the ECJ extended the right to receive med-
ical treatment abroad even to situations where this treatment is provided
in a third country (a EU non-member state). Ms. Keller, a German na-
tional, lived in Spain and, as a result, according to the system of the So-
cial Security Regulation, the Spanish health care authorities were sup-
posed to decide whether she was entitled to medical benefits or not.
When she became ill, they authorized her to go to Germany in order to
receive medical treatment in a hospital there. Due to the complicated
character of her illness, the German doctors who treated Ms. Keller sent
her to a hospital in Switzerland. Because Switzerland is not a member of
the EU, the Spanish authorities refused to reimburse the costs of her
treatment there.
The decision by Spanish authorities was, however, not upheld by
the ECJ. The ECJ pointed out that the Spanish health care authorities
were bound by the findings of the authorities of the state of stay (in this
case, Germany) as regards the need for urgent, vitally necessary treat-
ment.9' The Spanish authorities must respect the decisions made by the
doctors of the country of stay, even if this implies that the patient con-
cerned must be transferred to a hospital in a country that is not a member
of the EU. Hence, under certain circumstances, EU law obliges even the
9 Id.
90 C-145/03, Heirs of Annette Keller v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, 2005 E.C.R. I-
2529 [hereinafter Keller].
9' Id. para. 63.
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Member States to reimburse costs of medical treatment received by a pa-
tient outside the territory of the EU.
Furthermore, the ECJ has used the Social Security Regulation in
order to create extensive rights for retired persons. Article 31 of the
Regulation provides that a pensioner who stays in a Member States other
than the one in which she or he resides is entitled-with members of her
or his family-to medical treatment in that state.92 Unlike (the original
words of) Article 22, this provision of the Social Security Regulation
does not use the words "whose condition necessitates immediate benefits
during a stay." In Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon and Vasilios Ioannidis
(IKA),93 the ECJ deduced from the difference between both Articles that
the right of a pensioner, when staying on the territory of another Member
State-e.g., for the purpose of a family visit or to get medical treat-
ment-is not dependent upon the immediate necessity of the treatment.94
She or he has to right to receive medical treatment, for instance, in a hos-
pital of the Member State of stay, irrespective of whether it is an emer-
gency visit.
In this regard it should be noted that in Van der Duin,95 the ECJ
restricted the scope of the rights of pensioners. According to the system
of the Social Security Regulation, pensioners who stay with members of
their family in a Member State other than the one responsible for the
payment of their pensions, enjoy, for themselves and members of their
families, a right to benefits in kind from the relevant institution of the
Member State of residence, as if they were pensioners under the legisla-
tion of that State. This implies that the authorities of the Member State
of residence are able to issue permission for medical treatment in other
Member States, even if this treatment takes place in the Member State
that is liable for the payment of their pensions. In Van der Duin, a pen-
sioner who enjoyed a pension under Dutch legislation, moved to France
after retirement. Accordingly, she was obliged to apply for prior autho-
rization for medical treatment in the Netherlands by the French authori-
ties. However, because the pensioner failed to file an application, the
ECJ found that the authorities had not violated EU law when they re-
fused to reimburse the costs of the medical treatment received in a Dutch
hospital.
92 Id. paras. 60-62. See also Council Regulation 1408171, supra note 52, art. 31.
93 Case C-326/00, Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon v. loannidis, 2003 E.C.R. 1-1703.
94 Id. paras. 39-43.
95 Case C-156/01, Van der Duin v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ANOZ Zorgverzekeringen
UA, 2003 E.C.R. 1-7045.
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All in all, it could be argued that not only the Treaty provisions
on free movement, but also the Social Security Regulation has inspired
the ECJ to intervene in the national organization of the delivery of health
care. The regime on cross-border health care established in the Social
Security Regulation gives a lot of possibilities to elaborate on the main
principles advanced in judgments such as Decker and Kohll.
It must also be pointed out that in the short run, the current So-
cial Security Regulation will be replaced by Regulation 883/2004.96 So
far, however, it is not clear when the later regulation will enter into force.
As for cross-border health care, the new Regulation will constitute an
important change in law. Specifically, according to Article 19 of the new
Regulation, insured persons and their families are entitled to benefits in
kind when staying in Member States other than the one in which they re-
side. In order to get access to this medical treatment, proof that the
treatment is immediately necessary is no longer required. Meanwhile,
Social Security Regulation 631/2004"7 has already removed the word
"immediate" from Article 22(1)(a) of the current Regulation, 1408/71.
Because this provision regulates the rights of workers staying in the terri-
tory of another Member State, the "health care position" of workers is
improved.98 Thus, "the IKA approach" is extended from pensioners to all
insured persons.
E. INITIATIVES AT THE EU-LEVEL THAT RESPOND TO THE CASE
LAW OF THE ECJ ON HEALTH CARE
Thus far, the EU measures towards the national organization of
health care are mainly "negative in form," they aim to remove obstacles
to cross-border health care. But it is clear that issues of "a positive na-
ture," like the setting of minimum quality standards and transparency re-
quirements, need to be regulated as well. This is particularly true be-
cause Member States are not able to control these issues in the case of
cross-border health care.9 The consequence of ECJ case law is that the
96 Council Regulation 883/2004 on the Coordination of Social Security Systems, 2004 O.J. (L 166)
1 (EC).
97 See Council Regulation 631/2004 amending Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC on the Applica-
tion of Social Security Schemes, 2004 O.J. (L 100) 1, 2 (EC).
98 See F.J.L. PENNINGS, GRONDSLAGEN VAN HET EUROPESE SOCIALEZEKERHEIDSRECHT 177
(2005).
99 See Mel Cousins, Patient Mobility and National Health Systems, 34 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON.
INTEGRATION 183, 191 (2007); Gareth Davies, Competition, Free Movement, and Consumers of
Public Services, 17 EuR. Bus. L. REV. 95, 103-04 (2006).
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health authorities of the Member States have less discretion than was in-
tended in order to restrict the number of patients seeking treatment
abroad. 100
Furthermore, some argue that the incremental development of
the cases on health care and free movement gives rise to legal uncertain-
ty. ' So, it is no surprise that the ECJ case law on patient mobility has
led to several EU legislative initiatives. In 2004, the Commission issued
a draft Services Directive." 2 The aim of this Directive was to stimulate
EU Member States' services markets. The Directive covers both the
provision of services on a temporary basis (free movement of services)
and on a permanent basis (freedom of establishment). The first version
of this draft" 3 included health services and harmonized the ECJ's case
law on the free movement of services and patient mobility. According to
the then-proposed Article 16, the providers of services would only be
subject to the national legislation of their home country ("country of ori-
gin principle"), unless certain exceptions were applicable. Article 17
(paragraph 18) of the 2004 Draft stated that the country of origin would
not apply to authorization schemes regarding the reimbursement of hos-
pital care. As a result, all authorization schemes with regard to non-
hospital care were not allowed to be applied to health care services by
providers of other Member States.
However, the Commission faced a lot of resistance while defend-
ing its 2004 proposal; it was feared that the proposal would not lead to a
proper balance between market forces and objectives of public interest.'04
100 Christopher Newdick, Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual
Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1645, 1663 (2006).
101 Dawes, supra note 62, at 178-79. He also points out that the application of the EC Treaty provi-
sions on free movement by national courts in various Member States has resulted in divergent in-
terpretations of the case law of the ECJ. Id. at 174-78.
102 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Services
in the Internal Market, COM (2004) 2 final/3 (Mar. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Draft Services Direc-
tive].
103 Commission of the European Community, [Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and the Council on Services in the Internal Market], COM (2004) 621 definitief/2 (Feb. 25,
2004).
'04 In this respect the speech of the Commissioner for the internal market, delivered in the European
Parliament on March 9, 2005 is illustrative. The resistance with regard to the Draft Services Di-
rective "inspired" him to make the following statement: "However, I realize that the services di-
rective as initiated has not a snowball's chance in hell of getting through either the Council of
Ministers or the European Parliament." Charlie McGreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt.
Servs., Discussion in the European Parliament Plenary on the Services Directive,
SPEECH/05/148 (Mar. 9, 2005). See also Stefan Griller, The New Services Directive of the
European Union: Hopes and Expectations from the Angle of a (Further) Completion of the In-
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As a result, the controversial country of origin principle has been re-
placed by the requirement imposed upon the Member States to respect
the free movement of services. What is more, the health care sector has
been excluded from the Services Directive: °5 Article 2(2)(f) now pro-
vides that health care services, whether public or private, do not fall
within the scope of the Directive. Thus, in the author's view, the aim of
this provision is to guarantee to as great an extent possible that the organ-
ization of health care systems of the Member States is not affected by the
Services Directive. 10 6
Conversely, in its press release 7 accompanying the amendments
to the 2004 Draft, the Commission announced that it would come for-
ward with a separate initiative in the field of health, covering, inter alia,
the issues of patient mobility. Therefore, it was clear that the Commis-
sion did not give up its attempts to codify the ECJ's case law on patient
mobility and to facilitate the exercise of the rights patients may derive
from this case law.
F. THE DRAFT DIRECTIVE ON THE APPLICATION OF PATIENTS'
RIGHTS IN F. CROSS-BORDER HEALTH CARE
In September 2006, the Commission started a consultation
process and asked the Member States and other actors whether the EU
legislature should become involved in the field of health services. 8 In
its so-called Health Initiative, the Commission proposed to harmonize
ternal Market, in FIDE XXIII CONGRESS LINZ 2008, CONGRESS PUBLICATION VOL. 3, at 381-82
(H. Koeck & M. Karollus eds.).
'05 Council Directive 2006/123 on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36 (EC).
106 However, the Commission points out that services that are not provided to a patient but to a
health professional or to a hospital (such as accounting services and the provision of and main-
tenance of medical equipment) do fall within the scope of the Services Directive and are not ex-
cluded of its scope by Article 2(2)(f. See DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR INTERNAL MARKET AND
SERVICES, HANDBOOK ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SERVICES DIRECTIVE 12 (2007), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/services/docs/services-dir/guides/handbook-en.pdf. Fur-
thermore, it is put forward that the exclusion of health services only covers activities that are re-
served to a regulated health profession. Id.
07 Press Release, European Comm'n, Services Directive: Commission Puts Forward Amended
Proposal (IP/06/442) (Apr. 4, 2006).
108 Communication from the Commission, Consultation Regarding Community Action on Health
Services, SEC (2007) 1195/4 (Sept. 26, 2006) [hereinafter Community Action on Health Servic-
es], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/health/phoverview/co-Operation/mobility/docs/comm.-health-services_
comm2006en.pdf. For a discussion of this regulation, see, e.g., Frans Pennings, Co-ordination
of Social Security on the Basis of the State-of-Employment Principle: Time for an Alternative?,
42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 67 (2005).
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certain matters related to cross-border health care. It was suggested that
issues like liability and the provision of information could become sub-
ject to EU legislation." 9
On April 20, 2007, the Commission published the results of this
consultation process."' From these results it appeared that the case law
of the ECJ gave rise to several problems-partly of a practical nature (for
instance, lack of information) and partly of a legal nature (for example,
questions related to liability). Therefore, many contributors shared the
view of the Commission that some measures should be taken."' Yet, the
opinions were divided as to the nature of the measures to be taken. The
idea of the adoption of a specific directive on patient mobility was not
supported by every Member State." 2 In this respect, it should be noted
that for some Member States, the far-reaching consequences of the case
law on the free movement of health services is hard to accept."3
In December 2007, the Commission announced that it intended
to launch a draft legislative measure on patient mobility." 4 Due to some
practical (and also perhaps political) problems, the launching of this pro-
posal was postponed. On April 1, 2008 during a meeting with the Envi-
ronment Committee of the European Parliament, the Commissioner for
Health promised to publish a draft proposal in June 2008."1 The Draft
Directive on the Application of Patients' Rights in Cross-Border Health
Care"6 was finally published on July 2, 2008."'
109 Community Action on Health Services, supra note 108, at 7-8.
"10 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 41.
.. Id. at 34.
12 Id. at 34-35.
"3 As already stated, the official position of the U.K. is that it cannot be derived from the case law
of the ECJ that patients may seek any non-hospital care in other Member States without prior au-
thorisation. Id. at 15.
"4 Agenda, Top News from the Eur. Comm'n from 10 December to 6 January, at II (Dec. 7, 2007),
available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=AGENDA/07/43&format=HTML&age
d=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
"' Press Release, Eur. Parl., Summary of Hearing of Androula Vassiliou, Commissioner-designate
for Health (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings/commission/2008/press/press-release-en.pdf.
1.6 Commission Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Ap-
plication of Patients' Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare, COM (2008) 414 final (July 2, 2008)
[hereinafter Draft Directive].
117 Id. See also Europa - Public Health, New Commission Initiative on Patient's Rights in Cross-
Border Healthcare,
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph-overview/co-Operation/healthcare/proposal-directive-en.htm (last
visited Oct. 24, 2008).
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The objective of the Draft Directive is the establishment of a
general framework for cross-border health care in the EU.118 It contains
some remarkable provisions. For example, pursuant to Article 5, the
Member States-taking into account the principles of universality,
access to good quality, equity, and solidarity-must clearly define quali-
ty and safety standards for health care provided on their territory and en-
sure that mechanisms are in place for guaranteeing that health care pro-
viders are able to meet such standards. Furthermore, Article 5 stipulates
that compliance with the standards must be regularly monitored, health
care providers give all patients necessary information, and patients have
a means of making complaints and are guaranteed remedies and compen-
sation when they suffer harm resulting from medical treatment. Moreo-
ver, Article 5 requires that Member States introduce systems of profes-
sional liability insurance, a guarantee, or similar arrangements.
Additionally, the patient's fundamental rights to privacy regarding the
processing of personal data and to equal treatment must be respected. In
the author's opinion, Article 5 is a starting point for the development of
basic principles and requirements for national health care systems in Eu-
rope. After all, it provides a common and general framework for the or-
ganization and delivery of health care.
Article 7 of the Draft Directive provides that a Member State
may not subject to prior authorization the reimbursement of the costs of
non-hospital care provided in another Member State. This requirement is
in line with the settled case law of the ECJ.
Article 8 of the Draft Directive states that a Member State is al-
lowed to provide for a system of prior authorization allowing for reim-
bursement of hospital care costs in other Member States, provided that
the following conditions are fulfilled. First, the treatment concerned
would have been assumed by the social security system of the other
Member State if this treatment had been provided in its own territory.
Second, the prior authorization scheme aimed at addressing the outflow
of patients and preventing the serious undermining of (1) the financial
balance of the national social security systems, (2) the planning and ra-
tionalization carried out in the hospital sector, (3) the maintenance of a
balanced medical and hospital service open to all, and (4) the mainten-
ance of treatment capacity or medical competence. According to Article
8, not all interests that may justify restrictions on the free movement of
hospital services are mentioned by the ECJ in its case law. Judgments in
U8 Draft Directive, supra note 116, at 4, 18.
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cases such as Smits-Peerbooms, Maller-Faur6, and Watts focus mainly
on arguments of planning and financial balance. In response to such ar-
guments, the Draft Directive adds arguments such as a balanced medical
and hospital service, maintenance of treatment capacity, and medical
competence. From the perspective of the Member States, it could be ar-
gued that Article 8 broadens their possibilities to protect their hospital
sectors.
Yet, it should also be noted that this provision adds a require-
ment to the assessment of prior authorization schemes, in the context of
hospital care, which has not played a (significant) role thus far in ECJ
case law. Under the Draft Directive, Member States may only protect
their hospital sectors if the outflow of patients is capable of seriously un-
dermining one of the interests mentioned above (e.g., financial balance,
etc.). In its case law, the ECJ has not examined whether the outflow of
patients may seriously undermine a national scheme of hospital care. It
has simply put forward that the free movement of hospital services may
be restricted, provided that the patient concerned can be treated without
undue delay by a Member State hospital. In the view of the ECJ, hospit-
al care must be subjected to an advanced system of planning. In this re-
gard, the ECJ presupposes the serious undermining of hospital care as
soon as a patient seeks treatment abroad. From this perspective, the
Draft Directive limits the possibilities of the Member States to protect
their hospital sectors.
Comparable to the second generation of ECJ case law discussed
in Part I, Section B of this article, the Draft Directive sets rules which
aim to facilitate cross-border health care. For instance, Article 6 elabo-
rates on the case law dealing with reimbursement rates (such as the
above mentioned judgments Vanbraekel and Watts). Furthermore, Ar-
ticle 9 formulates procedural guarantees regarding administrative proce-
dures on the use of health care in another Member State. These proce-
dures must, for example, be based on objective, non-discriminatory
criteria which are published in advance and are necessary and proportio-
nate. It could be argued that the provision aims at codifying the ECJ
case law dealing with the procedures and conditions regulating the grant-
ing of prior authorizations. In addition, in my opinion, Article 12 of the
Draft Directive is rather remarkable. It obliges Member States to set up
national contact points for cross-border health care. Consequently,
Member States are forced to encourage their citizens to consider under-
going medical treatment in other Member States.
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The Draft Directive provides mechanisms for cooperation on
health care between the competent authorities. Pursuant to Article 15,
Member States must, for instance, facilitate the development of Euro-
pean reference networks of health care providers. The objective of these
networks is inter alia to help to realize the potential of European refer-
ence networks regarding highly specialized health care and to help to
promote access to high quality and cost-effective health care for all pa-
tients with special medical conditions. Another noteworthy provision of
the Draft Directive is Article 14; prescriptions issued by an authorized
person in another Member State for a named patient can be used in the
territory of the Member State where the patient resides.
At the time this article was written (during the second half of
2008), the position taken by the Member States and other actors towards
the Draft Directive was not yet clear. However, it goes without saying
that this draft will be much debated and (probably even heavily)
amended before it will be adopted.
G. OTHER HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES
In October 2007, the Commission published the White Paper
"Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013."' l
In that document, the Commission put forward several objectives for EU
health policy: fostering good health in an aging Europe, protecting citi-
zens from health threats, and supporting the development of dynamic
health systems and new technologies.' 2' The White Paper also stressed
that issues of health policy should be integrated in other policy fields
and, in order to realize this goal, "Health in All Policies" (HIAP) was
launched. 2' The aim of he HIAP approach is to strengthen integration of
health concerns into all policies at Community, Member State, and re-
gional levels.
This integrated approach is already prescribed for in Article
152(1) of the EC Treaty, which provides that a high level of human
health protection must be ensured in the definition and implementation of
all EU policies and activities. Yet, the HIAP method not only encom-
passes the accommodation of health care objectives in other EU areas,
but also encourages the involvement of new partners, such as non-
119 Commission White Paper Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-20013,
COM (2007) 630 final (Oct. 23, 2007).
120 Id. at 7-10.
121 Id. at 6.
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governmental organizations (NGO's), industry, academia, and the media
in EU health policy. 22 In other words, the Commission is attempting to
set up a health care network consisting of both public authorities of the
Member States and private actors at the EU level.
On March 25, 2008, the Commission launched a public consulta-
tion on patient safety. After this consultation, the Commission plans to
publish a proposal for general patient safety issues. 23 The Commission
puts forward that the aim of the proposal will likely be twofold. In the
first place, the proposal will attempt to support Member States in their
efforts to minimize harm to patients from adverse events in their health
systems.124 In the second place, the proposal will strive to improve the
confidence of EU citizens about receiving good information on levels of
safety and available redress in the EU health system. 25 This information
must concern the activities of both health care providers in their own
country and health care providers in other Member States.
H. EVALUATION
Consequently, although Article 152(5) of the EC preserves the
organization of health services and medical care to the Member States,
the Commission is working on a EU health policy that will have consi-
derable impact on the organizational structure of the national health care
systems. After stating that it wants to cooperate closely with the Mem-
ber States in order to achieve the health care objectives of the Strategic
Approach, the Commission suggested that it will come up with a "Struc-
tured Cooperation Implementation Mechanism. 126 Therefore, there is a
chance that national health polices will be increasingly interlinked with
the health policy developed at EU level. Furthermore, the Commission
reaffirms that it intends to issue a framework for health services,'27 the
aim of which is to further support areas where EC action can add value
122 Id.
123 The Commission, however, pointed out in March 2008 that there is already legislation on issues
related to patient safety at EU level. The Commission refers, inter alia, to Directives in the field
of medical devices. See Europa-Public Health, Commission Launch of an Open Consultation on
Public Safety, http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph-overview/patient safety/consultationen.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2008).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Commission White Paper Together for Health. supra note 119, at 10.
127 Commission Staff Working Document - Document Accompanying the White Paper Together for
Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013, at 19-20, SEC (2007) 1376.
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(such as developing European networks of reference centers ensuring
that patients have access to highly specialized care) and to clarify the ap-
plication of EU law to health services.
Hence, EU law and policy measures developed by the Commis-
sion are creeping into national health law. A case in point is the remark
on good governance made in the document containing the Impact As-
sessment of the Strategic Approach of the Commission.2 ' Good gover-
nance is needed and therefore a coherent framework overarching all EU
measures and documents with regard to health must be developed at the
EU level. It is possible that such a framework will not only touch all sec-
tors of EU health policy, but also national health care systems; it could
be capable of setting references and standards that national health care
policy makers will respond to.
It is clear that the ECJ's case law on patient mobility gave a sig-
nificant boost to the expansion of EU health policy. It enables the Com-
mission to start building a coherent framework for health care at the EU
level.
Nevertheless, these developments are not in line with the ambi-
tions of some Member States to revitalize the principle subsidiarity.'29
These ambitions are reflected in the drafting process of the Treaty of
Lisbon (also known as the Reform Treaty). For instance, a protocol on
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality is an-
nexed to the Treaty. 3' The protocol introduces a procedure according to
which national parliaments may intervene in the decision process at the
EU level, if the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are at stake
in the view of these parliaments. However, in this regard, it must be
noted that the status of the Treaty of Lisbon, including its protocols, was
unclear at the moment that this contribution was written (second half
2008), because the people of Ireland, via referendum, voted against the
treaty on June 13, 2008.'
128 Commission Staff Working Document - Accompanying Document to the White Paper Together
for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008-2013, at 20, SEC (2007) 1374.
129 According to the principle of subsidiarity, the Community shall take action ". . . only if and in so
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States
and can therefore, by reason of scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community." EC Treaty art. 5.
130 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 1, at C 306/150-51.
131 Statement by Jos6 Manuel Barroso, President, European Comm'n, following the Irish Referen-
dum on the Treaty of Lisbon (June 13, 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/commission barroso/president/pdf/statement_
2 0080613.pdf.
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It could be argued that while drafting EU measures, the Com-
mission should take into consideration the feelings of many national
governments regarding the division of powers between the EU and its
Member States. Otherwise, there exists the danger that several proposals
submitted by the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment will be voted down.
II. COMPETITION LAW AND HEALTH CARE
Another EU regime that is capable of stimulating cross-border
health care is competition law. This regime is laid down in Articles 81
and 82 of the EC, and in the Merger Control Regulation.132 Patients
could challenge restrictive measures taken by institutions such as sick-
ness funds and insurance companies by claiming that these measures are
contrary to EU competition rules. For instance, if insurance companies
have agreed not to reimburse the costs related to cross-border care, a
successful lawsuit against such an agreement may lead to a ruling that
the practice is in violation of the cartel prohibition. Such a ruling might
enable patients to receive health services abroad eventually. Conse-
quently, from a theoretical point of view, the EU competition rules could
foster patient mobility as firmly as the Treaty provisions on free move-
ment do now.
Since private entities such as insurers, hospitals, and doctors play
a significant role in health care, one may even expect that competition
law is more appropriate than the EU free movement regime, in address-
ing issues of cross-border care. From the perspective of the framers of
the original European Economic Community Treaty (Treaty of Rome),
the competition rules are directed at undertakings-i.e., private parties-
whereas the free movement provisions are aimed at regulating measures
taken by Member States-i.e., public authorities. On the one hand, there
is no denying that the demarcation between these regimes has been
blurred. This is due in large part to the fact that the ECJ has developed
concepts like the horizontal effect of some Treaty provisions on free
movement,'33 which enables a private party to invoke a free movement
132 Council Regulation 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (the EC
Merger Regulation), 2004 OJ (L 24) 1.
133 See, e.g., Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921; Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Rispannio de Bol-
zano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. 1-4139; Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97, Deli~ge v. Ligue Franco-
phone de Judo et Disciplines Associ6es, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2549; Case C-176/96, Lehtonen v.
F6d6ration Royale Beige des Soci~t6s de Basketball, 2000 E.C.R. 1-2681; Case C-438/05, Int'l.
Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP, 2008 E.C.R. _ (Dec. 11, 2007); and Case C-
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rule vis A vis another private party, and the "useful effect" norm, 34 which
applies the competition regime to measures stemming from state bodies.
On the other hand, one might expect that, if "the state oriented free
movement rules" increasingly contribute to the free movement of health
services, the same will be true for EU competition law.
However, the ECJ's case law on the application of the competi-
tion rules to health care is far less expansive than its case law on free
movement and cross-border health care. It appears that the ECJ is rather
reluctant to make health care issues subject to competition law. This
conclusion can be derived from its case law on the concept of undertak-
ings.
The following section begins with a discussion of the rulings of
the European courts with regard to the concept of undertakings. Then, an
examination of the relationship between the substantive EU competition
rules and cross-border care will follow.
A. THE CONCEPT OF UNDERTAKINGS
The subject matter of the prohibitions laid down in Articles 81
and 82 of the EC are undertakings. 35 According to settled ECJ case law,
every entity engaged in an economic activity should be regarded as an
undertaking.'36 Furthermore, economic activities are defined as the offer-
ing of goods or services on the market.37 However, the exercise of com-
petences that are typical of the public domain ("state prerogatives") does
not amount to an economic activity. 3 ' Moreover, in social security cas-
es, the ECJ has developed an approach that departs from the question of
341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetaref6rbundet, 2008 E.C.R. - (Dec.
18, 2007).
134 See, e.g., Case 267/86, Van Eycke v. ASPA NV, 1988 E.C.R. 4769; Case C-245/91, Criminal
Proceedings against Ohra Schadeverrzekeringen NV, 1993 E.C.R. 1-5851. According to this
case law, Article 85 in conjunction with Article 5 of the EC Treaty prohibits Member States from
depriving Article 81 or Article 82 of their useful effect. Such will be the case if a Member State
requires or favours the adoption of agreements, decisions, or concerted practices in violation of
Article 81 or reinforces their effects, or deprives its own legislation of its official character by
delegating to private companies the responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic
sphere.
135 Undertakings are companies or enterprises. The official term used in Articles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty is "undertaking."
136 See, e.g., Case C-41/90, Hbfner v, Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979.
137 See, e.g., Case 118/85, Comm'n v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 2599.
138 See, e.g., Case C-364/92, SAT Fluggesellschaft mbH v. European Org. for the Safety of Air Na-
vigation, 1994 E.C.R. 1-43; Case C-343/95, Diego Cali v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova
SpA, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1547.
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how significant the role of the principle of solidarity is. 13 9 It has instead
scrutinized how much room a national social security scheme leaves for
competition in the implementation of a social security scheme, and what
role the principle of solidarity plays.4 ' When a social security scheme is
almost completely based on solidarity, the institution managing the
scheme cannot be regarded as an undertaking. 4' In contrast, if the im-
plementation of a social security scheme is based on a mix of competi-
tion and solidarity elements, the institutions concerned do perform an
economic activity and can, as a result, be seen as an undertaking.'42
The ECJ has applied this approach towards the concept of under-
takings in health care in several cases.'43 It is the author's belief that a
distinction should be made between (1) rulings with regard to the ques-
tion of whether entities administrating health care systems are engaged in
economic activities and (2) rulings where it is decided whether this is the
case with respect to health care providers.
13 See, e.g., JOSE LUIS BUENDIA SIERRA, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AND STATE MONOPOLIES UNDER EC
LAW 52-56 (Andrew Read trans., 1999).
140 See, e.g., Vassilis G. Hatzopoulos, Killing National Health and Insurance Systems but Healing
Patients? The European Market for Health Care Services after the Judgments of the ECJ in
Vanbraekel and Peerblooms, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 683, 710-13 (2002); Elias Mossialos &
Martin McKee in collaboration with Willy Palm, Beatrix Karl, & Franz Marhold, The Influence
of European Union Law on the Social Character of Health Care Systems in the European Union
(Nov. 19, 2001), in EU Law and the Social Character of Health Care, 38 WORK & SOCIETY 98
(2002); Sybille Sahmer, Krankenversicherung in Europa: Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Stellung
der Kranken- und Pflegeversicherungstrdger im Bereich der freiwilligen Versicherung [Health
Insurance in Europe: The Competition-Legal Position of the Ill and Nursing Care Insurance
Carriers within Range of the Voluntary Insurance], in 8 BONNER EUROPA-SYMPOSIUM, Die
Krankenversicherung in der Europ~ischen Union [The Health Insurance in the European Union]
53(1997).
14' See, e.g., Joined Cases C-159 & C-160/91, Poucet v. Assurances G~nrales de France, 1993
E.C.R. 1-637; Case C-218/00, Cisal di Battistello Venanzio v. Istituto Nazionale per
I'Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro, 2002 E.C.R. 1-691. Cf UNIVERSITY LIBRE DE
BRUXELLES & KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN, INTERNAL MARKET AND HEALTH CARE: A
NEW BALANCE? 49 (Sept. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/int/europees/Nederands/Onderzoek/Onderzoeksprojecten/health
_services_col 57 en.pdf; Davies, supra note 99, at 98-100.
142 See, e.g., Case C-244/94, Fd6ration Frangaise des Soci6t6s d'Assurance v. Minist6re de
l'Agriculture et de la Pche, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4013 [hereinafter FFSA]; Case C-67/96, Albany Int'l
BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751; Joined Cases C-
115, C-1 16 & C-1 17/97, Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6025; and Case C-219/97, Maatschappij Drij-
vende Bokken BV v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer-en Havenbedrijven, 1999 E.C.R.
1-6121.
143 See Hatzopoulos, supra note 140, at 703-10.
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1. THE CONCEPT OF UNDERTAKINGS AND BODIES ADMINISTRATING
HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS
The leading case on the application of the concept of undertak-
ings to managing bodies such as sickness funds is AOK Bundesverband
and others v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co. and others
(AOK)14 At issue in AOK, was the question of whether sickness funds
were engaged in economic activities in Germany. These funds entered
into agreements on the reimbursement rates of medicines purchased by
patients. The agreements were part of the German health care system.
In the first stage, the Federal Committee of Doctors and Sickness Funds
had to decide for which groups of medical products fixed maximum
amounts must be determined. In the second stage, the funds jointly de-
termined the uniform fixed maximum amounts applicable to these groups
of medicines. This procedure is an example of the "consultative" struc-
ture of the German health care system.'45
The involvement of bodies operating independently from the
government made this system vulnerable to litigation. To a certain ex-
tent, it is remarkable that the first case in which the German system was
challenged in light of European competition law was brought before the
ECJ not earlier than the beginning of this millennium. Pharmaceutical
undertakings claimed that the agreements on the fixed amounts were
contrary to the cartel prohibition of Article 81 of the EC. The competi-
tion rules of the EU provided them with legal arguments to contest the
decisions on the rates of these amounts. As soon as they were of the opi-
nion that the rate level did not match their expectations, they could chal-
lenge the decisions made by the German sickness funds by invoking EU
competition law.
Since the consultative structure is a significant feature of the
German health care system, the organization of this system was at stake.
If the ECJ had found that the agreements concerned were in violation of
Article 81 of the EC, this would have forced Germany to change consti-
tutive elements of its health care system. As a result, the ECJ was con-
'" Joined Cases C-264, C-306, C-354 & C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft
Cordes, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2493 [hereinafter AOK].
145 See Geert Jan Hamilton, Case Comment on the AOK Ruling, 3 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
GEZONDHEIDSRECHT [J. HEALTH L.] 244, 244-58 (2004).
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fronted with a politically sensitive question of how to strike a balance be-
tween the effective application of EU competition law and the Treaty
principle of respecting the national organization of health care.
In his opinion in the AOK case, Advocate General Jacobs devel-
oped a sophisticated approach towards this question. On the one hand,
he argued that the sickness funds were engaged in economic activities
and that their agreements restricted competition. On the other hand, he
was of the opinion that this restriction could be justified by Article 86(2)
of the EC. 46 According to that Treaty provision, undertakings entrusted
with special tasks may hinder competition (or free movement), provided
that the proportionality principle has been met. The Advocate General
suggested deploying a rather loose test with regard to this principle. He
argued that, given the fact that EU law accords Member States the free-
dom to organize their health care systems, which implies a wide margin
of discretion, the setting of fixed amounts only fall outside the scope of
Article 86(2) of the EC if this method of determining the rates for reim-
bursement could be shown to be manifestly disproportionate.'47 Basical-
ly, the approach proposed by the Advocate General boiled down to a so-
called "light control regime" that only disallowed exceedingly restrictive
agreements concluded in the framework of the German health care sys-
tem. According to this approach, the sickness funds are not totally "im-
mune" from the application of the competition rules, but they are subject
to a certain degree of judicial review in the light of those rules.
However, the ECJ opted for another solution in its judgment in
the AOK case. It solved the tension between the effective application of
the EU competition rules and the national organization of health care by
completely respecting the regulatory powers of the Member States: In
the view of the ECJ, the German sickness funds were not engaged in
economic activities and, as a result, their agreements did not need to be
reviewed in terms of European competition law.'48 Accordingly, the
agreements that were challenged by the pharmaceutical companies were
immune from the application of EU competition law.
In order to establish that the German sickness funds were not
undertakings, the ECJ applied the principles that it had developed in its
case law on social security schemes and competition. As already men-
tioned, this implies that the ECJ examined the role that solidarity plays in
146 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, AOK, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2493, paras. 24-103.
141 id. para. 95.
141 See AOK, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2493, paras. 45-65.
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the social security scheme.149 The ECJ based its decision (that German
sickness funds are not undertakings) on three arguments.
First, the ECJ stressed that the benefits to which affiliated per-
sons are entitled are fixed by the state as the funds are compelled by law
to offer their members essentially identical obligatory benefits. 5 These
benefits do not depend on the amount of the contributions.
Second, the ECJ held that the German sickness funds did not aim
to make a profit. This consideration is remarkable because in a previous
ruling, FFSA,'5' the ECJ held that bodies not aiming to make a profit
could nevertheless be engaged in economic activities. From this ruling it
could be derived that profit-making was not an element constituting the
concept of undertakings. Nevertheless, it could be argued that, based on
AOK, this element has made a come back.
Third, the ECJ referred to the system of risk equalization (Soli-
dargemeinschaft) the German sickness funds were engaged in." 2 Funds
whose health expenditure is high for the reason that they insure less
healthy people (so called "high risks") are compensated for those risks
by funds to which healthier persons are associated. It cannot be denied
that in a risk equalization scheme the solidarity principle plays a key
role.
On first impression, the decision of the ECJ seems to be based
upon sound analysis. However, in the AOK judgment some astounding
considerations can be found. It should be noted that the German sickness
funds were free to set their own contribution rates. Consequently, the
amount of the contributions to be paid by the insured persons differed
from sickness fund to sickness fund. Unsurprisingly, German internet
sites encourage people to switch to cheaper health insurers.53
The position that the ECJ took, regarding the freedom to set con-
tribution rates is, at least for the author, hard to understand. The ECJ felt
that the fact that sickness funds were engaged in some competition did
not call into question the conclusion that they were not undertakings.'54
The ECJ went on to say that the German legislature introduced an ele-
149 Id. para. 5 1.
"S0 Id. para. 52.
151 FFSA, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4013, para. 21.
52 AOK, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2493, paras. 53.
153 See, e.g., Health Insurance in Germany,
http://www.billigerkrankenversichert.de/international/health-insurance.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2008).
114 AOK, 2004 E.C.R. 1-2493, paras. 56-57.
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ment of competition in order to stimulate the funds to operate in the most
effective and least costly manner possible. 55 Considering that the legis-
lature's aim was to promote the proper functioning of the German health
care system, it could not be argued, according to the ECJ, that the nature
of the sickness funds activities had changed. The author cannot support
such a line of reasoning. After all, competition law is all about enhanc-
ing efficiency, which implies that as soon as a national legislature intro-
duces elements of competition into a social security system, the competi-
tion rules should be applied to bodies managing that system. In the
author's judgment, competition law must be regarded as the rules of the
game for privatized sectors. Efficiency will only be enhanced if the key
actors are required to observe the cartel prohibition, the prohibition on
the abuse of dominant position, and the merger control regime.
Therefore, the author cannot help but think that the ECJ's deci-
sion in the AOK case was politically driven. Consultative mechanisms
play a key role in German health care. If agreements concluded between
sickness funds were caught by the EU competition rules, this would have
endangered the proper functioning of the German system. Therefore, the
ECJ shied away from a logical and consequent application of the EU
competition rules to German sickness funds. The ECJ concluded, there-
fore, that even the so-called "light regime" that was proposed by the Ad-
vocate General-and would only have implied a ban on extremely re-
strictive practices-went too far.
The AOK approach gives rise to a remarkable conclusion: The
free movement rules, which were originally directed at Member States,
force sickness funds to consider whether the costs of certain cross-border
health services should be reimbursed. However, the main aim of EU
competition law, which is to regulate the conduct of private actors, does
not impose such duties upon them.'56
This somewhat remote approach towards the application of EU
competition law in health care was confirmed in the FENIN cases.'57
Here, at issue was the question of whether bodies managing health care
system should observe competition law when purchasing goods or ser-
155 Id.
156 Cf Markus Krajewski & Martin Farley, Non-Economic Activities in Upstream and Downstream
Markets and the Scope of Competition Law after FENIN, 32 EUR. L. REv. 111, 118 (2007).
151 See Case C-205/03 P, Federaci6n Espafiola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria v. Comm'n,
2006 E.C.R. 1-6295, paras. 26-37 [hereinafter FENIN (2006)]; Case T-319/99, Federaci6n Es-
pafiola de Empresas de Tecnologia Sanitaria v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-357, paras. 25-26 [he-
reinafter FENIN (2003)].
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vices. A decision taken by the Commission was challenged in this case,
which meant that this case was not only subject to review by the ECJ but
also by the Court of First Instance (CFI).
FENIN concerned the purchase activities of the Spanish NHS.
Since, in a NHS system, the managing bodies are obliged to provide
health care free of charge, it was not a surprise that in the view of both
the CFI and the ECJ these bodies were not undertakings within the mean-
ing of EU competition law. In such a system, the principle of solidarity
is predominant and the NHS entities do not compete with each other.'58
However, this point of view does not exclude the possibility that
they do fall within the scope of competition law when they purchase
goods or services from enterprises on the market. The purchase policy of
entities such as NHS bodies or sickness funds have a considerable influ-
ence on various markets, since many suppliers of medical goods and
providers of medical services are highly dependent upon them. If health
care suppliers or providers are not engaged in business relations with
these bodies, they are probably not able to operate on the market at all.
Additionally, in many EU Member States, policy makers introduce in-
centives in the health care sector in order to enhance the functioning of
purchase markets (markets on which health insurers and NHS bodies op-
erate as purchasers).
If the ECJ and CFI had decided that the Spanish NHS bodies
were undertakings as far as their purchasing activities were concerned,
the outcome of the AOK case would have been mitigated.'59 However,
both Community courts held that when an entity does not apply the pur-
chased goods or services to a market on which it offers products itself,
this entity is not an undertaking. 60 Accordingly, the status of the pur-
chasing entity is entirely dependent upon the subsequent application of
the goods and services it has acquired. The consequences are clear: bo-
dies managing health care schemes in which the principle of proportio-
nality is predominant are not subject to competition law neither when
providing services to affiliated persons nor when buying products in or-
der to carry out this task.
158 See also Andreas Bartosch, Social Housing and European State Aid Control, 28 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 563, 565 (2007).
'5 Somaya Belhaj & Johan W. van de Gronden, Some Room For Competition Does not Make a
Sickness Fund An Undertaking, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 682, 685 (2004).
'60 See FENIN (2006), 2006 E.C.R. 1-6295, paras. 25-27; FEN[N (2003), 2003 E.C.R. 11-357, paras.
35-44.
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However, bodies managing health care systems do not, as a rule,
fall outside the scope of EU competition law. In fact, in relation to social
health care schemes, the ECJ applies a concrete test: The applicability of
competition law depends upon the way in which these schemes are mod-
eled by the Member States. Consequently, if the national legislature has
opted for a system which leaves much room for competition, these bo-
dies must be regarded as undertakings within the meaning of EU compe-
tition law. For instance, in the Netherlands, since 2006, private insur-
ance companies are the managing bodies of the Dutch health care
system.'61 In carrying out this task, they are allowed to be for-profit.
Accordingly, it may be assumed that these entities are engaged in eco-
nomic activities. As soon as the Member States of the EU make their
health care systems subject to a process of opening up, EU competition
law provides the relevant framework for reviewing the agreements and
other restrictive practices of health insurers. However, the "semi-
private" health care system of the Netherlands is rather unique in Europe,
because in other Member States public bodies and state authorities still
play a dominant role. As a result, EU institutions do not have much ex-
perience in applying EU competition rules (e.g., anti-trust law, state aid,
etc.) to health insurers.
2. THE CONCEPT OF UNDERTAKING AND HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Are providers of health care, like doctors and hospitals, under-
takings within the meaning of Article 81 of the EC? It is apparent from
cases like Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Spe-
cialisten162 that the ECJ applies a different test to these entities than it
does to social security and health care schemes.
In Pavlov, the ECJ held that medical specialists are engaged in
economic activities (in their capacity as self-employed economic opera-
tors) because they provide services for remuneration. The ECJ simply
applied the "undertaking qualification" based on the fact that these doc-
tors are paid by their patients (or their health insurers) for the services
they provide, whereas these doctors have to bear the financial risks at-
16' This system is introduced by the Zorgverzekeringswet [Health Insurance Act]. For a brief de-
scription of this bill, see Geert Jan Hamilton, A new Private Universal Health Insurance in the
Netherlands, in A. DEN EXTER, COMPETITIVE SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE YEARBOOK 2004, 8
(2005).
162 Joined Cases C-180 & C-184/98, Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, 2000
E.C.R. 1-6451.
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tached to the pursuit of these activities. 163 It is remarkable that the ECJ
did not scrutinize the legal framework that was applicable to the medical
specialists. For example, the ECJ did not examine whether this legal
framework included enough room for competition or whether the prin-
ciple of proportionality was predominant in this framework. Further-
more, the professional organization that the medical specialists were as-
sociated with was regarded as an association of undertakings despite the
fact that it was governed by national public law." The ECJ ruled that
because this organization was not composed of a majority of representa-
tives of public authorities and because it was not obliged to observe vari-
ous public-interest criteria, it did fall within the scope of EU competition
law. 165
The ECJ followed a similar approach in Ambulanz Gl6ckner v.
Landkreis Siidwestpfalz.166 At issue there was, inter alia, the question of
whether medical aid organizations to which public authorities have dele-
gated the task of providing a public ambulance service must be regarded
as undertakings in the sense of EU competition law. As in Pavlov, the
ECJ based its conclusion (that the entity at hand was engaged in an eco-
nomic activity) on the finding that medical services concerned were pro-
vided for remuneration.'67 Moreover, it was stressed that these activities
were not always and were not necessarily, carried out by public bodies.
68
It appeared from the files submitted to the Court that, in the past, private
organizations provided ambulance services. Thus, the ECJ counted the
possibility that the service at hand could possibly be provided on the
market of great importance.
Quite remarkably, in the ECJ's view, the legal framework appli-
cable to ambulance services and the way these services were modeled by
the national legislature were not relevant. The ECJ explicitly stated that
public service obligations may render the services at issue less competi-
tive than comparable services rendered by operators not bound by such
obligations, but that fact did not call into question the conclusion that
these services do not constitute economic activities.
69
163 Id. para. 76.
164 See id. paras. 71-89.
165 Id. para. 88.
166 Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Gl6ckner v. Landkreis Siidwestpfalz, 2002 E.C.R. 1-8089 [he-
reinafter Ambulanz Gl6ckner].
167 Id. para. 20.
168 Id.
169 Id. para. 21.
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So, when it comes to the question of whether health care provid-
ers are undertakings, in Ambulanz Glickner, the ECJ deviated from its
previous approach developed in cases such as AOK and FENIN. The
ECJ did not look at the concrete legal framework that was applicable to
those health care providers, but rather examined whether the medical
services concerned could be provided on the free market.
Is it possible that these services are offered to end users via mar-
ket mechanisms? If this is the case, the providers of these services do
fall within the scope of competition law. To the author it seems that one
could argue that, in an abstract way, the ECJ is examining whether health
care providers are engaged in economic activities. Hence, the approach
towards the application of the concept of undertakings to health care
providers is dependent upon an abstract test. In contrast, as has already
been advanced, the ECJ addresses the question of the concept of under-
taking with regard to bodies managing health care schemes by taking in-
to consideration the concrete (legal) framework, which boils down to the
application of a concrete test.
Consequently, health care providers are more often than not con-
fronted with the application of EU competition law than are bodies man-
aging health care schemes. In the author's view, a judgment on competi-
tion law and health care providers is less capable of affecting the national
health care organization than rulings in the field of competition law and
managing bodies. After all, the position of these bodies is at the heart of
the organization of the provision of health care as they decide on the
reimbursement of medical treatment. Accordingly, at the present stage
of the European integration process, EU competition law does not have
much influence on cross-border health care. The ECJ is probably at-
tempting to strike a balance between the internal market and national
health care authorities. By applying the Treaty provisions on free
movement to cross-border health care it takes account of the "internal
market interest" and by exempting managing bodies from the scope of
EU competition law, it observes the "health care organization powers" of
the Member States.
Therefore, it cannot be ignored that rulings like AOK are politi-
cally driven. By examining whether the principle of solidarity is predo-
minant in a national health care scheme, the Community courts are es-
sentially basing their decisions in part on the perceived will of the
national legislature. Competition law provides the rules of the game for
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privatized sectors.17° If a national legislature has introduced enough ele-
ments of competition in its health care system, the EU competition rules
are applicable. If the national legislature did not intend to introduce a
considerable amount of competition into such a system, the managing
bodies did not fall within the ambit of the EU competition rules.
B. EU COMPETITION LAW AND HEALTH CARE
It is not a surprise that only a few precedents on the application
of EU competition law to matters of cross-border care are available.
Nevertheless, some cases are worth mentioning. First, this section will
look at rulings on competition law and health care. Second, this section
will discuss cases where EU competition law is applied to managing bo-
dies that do fall within the scope of this field.
1. COMPETITION LAW AND HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
In cases like Pavlov and Ambulanz Glackner, policy measures
with regard to health care providers were assessed in the light of EU
competition law. However, Pavlov will not lead to more cross-border
care, because it concerned agreements between medical specialists with
regard to their pension schemes. Furthermore, according to the ECJ,
these agreements did not violate Article 81 of the EC, as they did not re-
strict competition in an appreciable way.
In this regard, Ambulanz Gl6ckner is of more interest, since in
that case, the ECJ dealt with an exclusive right given by a German feder-
al state to a public undertaking to provide emergency ambulance servic-
es. As a result, other undertakings were not entitled to carry out these
activities: both domestic providers and providers established in other
Member States were prevented from entering the market. Hence, in Am-
bulanz Gl~ckner, the issue of cross-border care was approached from the
"supply side" angle of health care (and not, like in free movement judg-
ments, from the "demand side" angle, i.e., the patients).
In Ambulanz Gl6ckner, the market for emergency transport was
reserved for one particular party. In contrast, state authorities could give
other companies access to the market for non-emergency transport.
However, before state authorities granted an authorization for this type of
170 Johan W. van de Gronden, Purchasing Care: Economic Activity or Service of General (Eco-
nomic) Interest?, 25 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 87 (2004).
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transport, they consulted the undertaking entrusted with the task of per-
forming emergency ambulance services. If this undertaking regarded
such an authorization as a danger to its special task (i.e., to transport pa-
tients in case of emergency), the German federal state refused to grant
authorization to the applicant. Although this practice did fall within the
scope of Article 86 (1) of the EC, which prohibits Member States from
granting exclusive rights that are in violation of, inter alia, the prohibi-
tion on the abuse of a dominant position, the ECJ held that the exclusive
right concerned was justifiable in the light of Article 86(2) of the EC.
Pursuant to this provision, special rights violating the EU rules on com-
petition were allowed, provided that they were necessary for a special
task entrusted to the undertaking by a public body.
The proportionality principle must also be observed. In Ambu-
lanz Gldckner, the ECJ took the position that the exclusive rights at hand
were in accordance with this principle, enterprises had to be prevented
from only offering transport by ambulance in non-urgent cases in urban
areas, so that the undertaking that is entrusted with task of the overall
ambulance transport would not be able to profitably offer its services in
urgent cases during the night and in rural areas.'71
It is apparent from the ruling in Ambulanz Gldckner that in other
cases where EU competition law is applicable, the national authorities
enjoy a wide margin of discretion. After all, it is clear that the ECJ did
not apply a strict proportionality test in Ambulanz Glickner in that it al-
lowed the undertaking entrusted with the task of the emergency ambul-
ance transport to monopolize the market for non-emergency transport.
Thus, under EU competition law, it is not very difficult for a
Member State to restrict cross-border health care offered by providers
established in other Member States. Apparently, the concept of Services
of General Economic Interest, as provided in Article 86(2) of the EC,
gives Member States the opportunity to regulate the national organiza-
tion of the delivery of health care services in a far-reaching way. Conse-
quently, at the present stage of the European integration process, EU
competition law does not preclude Member States from introducing cer-
tain restraints on competition in their health care systems.
Furthermore, according to Article 87(1) of the EC, Member
States are not allowed to give state aid to undertakings. The Commission
is, however, able to approve financial advantages given to enterprises on
the basis of Article 87(3) of the EC (which also mentions interests such
171 See Ambulanz Glockner, 2001 E.C.R. 1-8089, paras. 57-64.
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as a significant project of common European interest, the development of
certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, and culture) and
Article 86(2) of the EC. Article 88(3) of the EC requires Member States
to notify to the Commission of state aid measures before implementing
them (the so-called "standstill principle"). 72 In this respect, it should be
noted that the ECJ has developed a special approach towards financial
compensations for the performance of public service obligations.
In Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungsprdsidium Magdeburg
v. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH,173 the ECJ held that benefits
granted by Member States to an undertaking entrusted with the execution
of public service obligations do not constitute state aid, provided that the
following four conditions are fulfilled (1) the undertaking is charged with
the execution of a clearly defined public service obligation, (2) the para-
meters of the amount of the compensation are established objectively and
transparently, (3) the compensation is proportionate, and (4) in the case
of a public contract, the amount of the compensation is determined on
the basis of the expenses a well run undertaking would have incurred. 74
If national compensation measures fulfill these conditions, they are not
regarded as state aid and the Commission does not need to be notified of
them.
In the author's view, the concept of public service obligations
shares many similarities with services of general economic interest, as
provided in Article 86(2) of the EC. 75 After all, the point of departure
for both concepts is that a special task is entrusted to the undertaking by
a public authority. The main difference is that the second and fourth
condition of Altmark (the criterion related to objective and transparent
parameters respectively, the criterion regarding the benchmark of the
costs of a well-run company) do not play a key role in the ECJ's assess-
ment under Article 86(2) of the EC.
Due to the fact that health services are often regarded as services
of general economic interest in the EU (Ambulanz Gldckner), it is not a
surprise that the concept of public service obligations is applied in health
care as well. In 2005, the Commission adopted a Decision that elabo-
172 See, e.g, Case C-39/94, Syndicat Frangais de l'Express Int'l v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3547.
'7" Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. Nahverkehrsgeselschaft Altmark GmbH, 2003 E.C.R.
1-7747 [hereinafter Altmark].
174 See id. paras. 88-93.
175 See, e.g., Case T-289/03, British United Provident Ass'n Ltd. v. Comm'n, 2008 O.J. (C 79) 25,
para. 162 [hereinafter BUPA].
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rates on the ECJ's approach in Altmark. 76 The decision allows Member
States to grant state aid to hospitals.' The measures at play here are ex-
empted from the obligation of notifying the Commission of state aid, in
so far as the hospitals concerned are entrusted with the task of providing
services of general economic interest. Thus, the state aid rules laid down
in Articles 87 through 89 of the EC do not considerably interfere with the
Member States' powers to finance hospital care.
2. COMPETITION LAW AND MANAGING BODIES
This point of view is confirmed by the recent decision reached
by the Commission with respect to the Dutch health care system.7 In
the Dutch system, a considerable amount of room for competition exists
and private insurance companies are the managing bodies for the provi-
sion of the basic health care schemes. However, these private actors
must comply with certain criteria given in the Zorgverzekeringswet
(Health Insurance Act).
For example, private actors are obliged to engage in a system of
risk equalization. The discussion of the German AOK case has already
made clear that such a system amounts to the transfer of money from in-
surers of more healthy persons to insurers of less healthy people ("high
risks"). Under the Dutch Zorgverzekeringswet, an independent govern-
ment public body is entrusted with the task of managing these fund
flows.'79 As a result, a state body pays money to private insurance com-
panies, whose health expenditure is high for the reason that many unheal-
thy persons are affiliated with them. Since Articles 87 through 89 of the
EC preclude Member States from granting state aid to undertakings, un-
less the aid is approved by the Commission, the Dutch government in-
formed the Commission of their plans to adopt a system of risk equaliza-
tion.
In its decision, the Commission held that the payments made in
the framework of the Dutch risk equalization scheme constituted state
176 See Commission Decision on the Application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State Aid in
the Form of Public Service Compensation Granted to Certain Undertakings Entrusted with the
Operation of Services of General Economic Interest, 2005 O.J. (L 312) 67.
177 See generally Wolf Sauter, Services of General Economic Interest and Universal Service in Eu-
ropean Union Law, 33 EUR. L. REV. 167, 191-92 (2008).
178 See Commission Decision of 3 May 2005 on N 541/2004 & N 542/2004 on Retention of Finan-
cial Reserves by Dutch Health Insurance Funds and Introduction of a Risk Equalization System
in the Dutch Health Insurance, 2005 O.J. (C 324) 28.
"9 See Article 3 of the Zorgverzekeringswet.
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aid. 8° Furthermore, intra-Community trade was influenced and competi-
tion on the common market was distorted because the position of Dutch
health insurers was reinforced by the state aid, compared to the position
of similar undertakings in other Member States. However, the Commis-
sion held that the state aid was justified on the basis of Article 86(2) of
the EC. 18' The Commission held that the Dutch health insurance compa-
nies were entrusted with a service of general economic interest such as
the management of the basic health care program. 1
82
However, a recent judgment of the CFI justifies the expectation
that indeed the CFI would have found the Dutch system of risk equaliza-
tion to be in accordance with EU law.'83 Until the Commission's deci-
sion in the case of the Dutch risk equalization scheme, this Treaty provi-
sion was only applied to a limited number of undertakings. At the
moment of writing this article, a case brought against the Commission
decision on the Dutch risk equalization scheme was pending before the
CFI.'84 A case was brought against the Commission decision on the
Dutch risk equalization scheme. Unfortunately, the parties concerned
withdrew their appeal and the case was removed from the register of the
CFI. So the Community does have the opportunity to to review the ap-
proach that the Commission adopted in this case.
From this standpoint, a recent judgment of the CFI justifies the
expectation that indeed the CFI will find the Dutch system of risk equali-
zation to be in accordance with EU law. A few years ago, the Decision
85
by which the Commission approved the risk equalization scheme of the
Irish health care system was challenged by the British United Provident
Association (BUPA). On February 12, 2008, the CFI delivered its judg-
ment in the BUPA case. 186 In its sizeable judgment, the CFI upheld the
decision of the Commission. However, unlike the Commission in the
case on the Dutch risk equalization scheme, the CFI based its decision on
the Altmark judgment. This implies that, according to the CFI, the Irish
measure did not even constitute state aid within the meaning of Article
180 Sauter, supra note 177, at 18-25.
' Id. at 26-30.
.82 Case T-84/06, Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij Azivo Algemeen Ziekenfonds De Volharding
v. Comm'n, 2006 O.J. (C 108) 27.
181 See 2008 O.J. C327/41
84 Supra note 181.
's' Commission Decision of 13 May 2003 in Case N 46/2003, Risk Equalization Scheme in the Irish
Health Insurance Market, 2003 O.J. (C 186) 16.
186 See BUPA, 2008 E.C.R. _ (Feb. 12, 2008), 2008 O.J. (C 79) 25.
Vol 26, No. 3
HeinOnline  -- 26 Wis. Int'l L.J. 755 2008-2009
Wisconsin International Law Journal
87(1) of the EC. Consequently, the regulatory scope of the Member
States is rather broad in the setting up of a risk equalization scheme.
The CFI's considerations of the margin of appreciation are,
moreover, in line with this observation. The CFI decided that the compe-
tent authorities enjoyed a wide margin of discretion in entrusting under-
takings with special tasks. 8 7 The Community institutions' standard of
review were limited to ". . . ascertaining whether there is a manifest error
of assessment."'88 It may even be argued that the CFI's review of the
Commission's assessment regarding national entrustment of a special
task is subject to this standard of review. The CFI held, for instance, that
it was only entitled to examine whether the Commission made a manifest
error when it assessed the necessity and proportionality of the Irish
measures.'89 One could argue that a "double layer of a wide margin of
appreciation" exists under the approach adopted by the CFI in BUPA.
Hence, the role of the Community courts is rather limited under this ap-
proach.
Considering one of the Altmark conditions concerned entrusting
a public service obligation to a private company, the CFI had to examine
whether the Irish health insurers were entrusted with a special task. The
method followed by the CFI in its assessment confirms the conclusions
of the CFI in BUPA, which considerably respected the regulatory free-
dom of the Member States. 190 In point 182 of the BUPA judgment, the
CFI derived public service obligations from the general requirements laid
down in national legislation.19' The relevant Irish health law imposed
upon all insurance companies the obligation to provide private medical
insurance. In providing these services, they had to comply with obliga-
tions such as community rating, open enrolment, lifetime cover, and min-
imum benefits. All providers of private medical insurance were subject
to these obligations.
Therefore, the CFI rather easily assumed the existence of public
service obligations. Furthermore, it is of significant interest that the CFI
accepted that a Member State may impose public service obligations
upon an unlimited number of undertakings. In principle all health insur-
ers may be entrusted with such tasks. Since the CFI ruled that the con-
cept of public service obligations corresponded to that of the Services of
117 Id. para. 169.
188 Id.
"' Id. para. 220.
'90 See id. paras. 180-84.
-9 Id. para. 182.
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General Economic Interest of Article 86(2) of the EC, it may be assumed
that, in the view of this Community court, an open group of market oper-
ators may be entrusted with the performance of Services of General Eco-
nomic Interest. Consequently, the BUPA judgment can be regarded as
the first ruling in which a Community court applied the concept of Ser-
vices of General Economic Interest to an unlimited number of enterpris-
es.
As a result, the CFI has broadened the scope of this concept. In
addition, the majority of ECJ case law on Services of General Economic
Interest concerns network sectors. Services of General Economic Inter-
est are usually imposed upon a limited number of operators by Member
States in network sectors. Conversely, in sectors such as health care, an
open group of enterprises and organizations are supposed to contribute to
the realization of goals of general interest.
By accepting that Member States entrust an unlimited number of
operators with the execution of Services of General Economic Interest,
the CFI has paved the way for these services in the health care sector.
III. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that free movement rules have more influence on
national health care systems than EU competition law does. The role of
competition law is less significant because many public bodies managing
health care systems are not regarded as undertakings. However, accord-
ing to settled ECJ case law, health services themselves constitute eco-
nomic activities. Yet, EU competition law comes into play only when
national legislators deregulate and open up their health care systems.
Consequently, if the process of deregulation taking place in the health
care sector further takes shape in various Member States, competition
law will become increasingly important. After all, the EU regime on
competition provides the rules of the "free market game."
The applicability of EU competition rules to privatized health
care systems is capable of causing much legal uncertainty as only a few
precedents in the field of competition law and health care are currently
available in EU jurisprudence. The concepts of Services of General
Economic Interest and Public Service Obligations may provide more
guidance on how the goal of the enhancement of competition and general
interest issues may be reconciled. It is not a surprise that in the EU a de-
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bate is on-going in regards to whether the EU should issue specific rules
for Services of General (Economic) Interest.192
The Treaty provisions on free movement apply to the national
health care systems of the Member States, irrespective of whether these
programs are funded as reimbursement systems, benefits-in-kind sys-
tems, or as NHS systems. Some commentators have advanced the idea
that health care services and goods are subject to these Treaty provisions
when they are organized according to a system where payer and provider
are separate and independent institutions. 93 However, this point of view
can no longer be supported because in Watts the ECJ also applied the
free movement rules to the refusal of a British NHS body to reimburse
the costs of medical treatment received in France. After all, in a "state-
based" system like the NHS there is not a clear distinction between pro-
viders and payers. Based on case law like Watts and Freskot, the EU re-
gime on free movement is applicable to health care and other social secu-
rity schemes that concern insurable benefits. This implies that national
basic health care schemes fall within the ambit of this regime, as a rule. 94
Moreover, this should be considered in the context of the fact that the
majority of the medical treatments covered by these schemes are insura-
ble.
The ECJ's case law on free movement obliges the Member
States to make a distinction between hospital and non-hospital care.
With regard to non-hospital care, patients are free to choose between
domestic and foreign providers. As for hospital care, Member States are
forced to manage their systems properly, for instance, taking into account
the interests of patients (e.g., in terms of waiting lists, international med-
ical standards, etc.). If they succeed in paying sufficient consideration to
these interests, the Member States are allowed to restrict the free move-
ment of hospital services. In examining whether the health authorities
have managed their systems properly, the ECJ is setting standards for:
reimbursement rates, waiting lists, and prior authorization procedures on
192 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities Communication Accompanying the Com-
munication on "A Single Market for 21st Century Europe: " Services of General Interest, includ-
ing Social Services of General Interest: A New European Commitment, COM (2007) 725 final
(Nov. 20, 2007).
193 HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 50, at 136; Davies, supra note 99, at 97-99; and Mark Flear,
Case Note, Case C-385/99 V.G. Miller-Fauro v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappii O.Z Zorg-
verkeringen U.A. and E.E.M. van Riet v. Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschapii ZA.0. Zorgverzeke-
ringen, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 209, 220-21 (2004).
'94 Cf Maximilian Fuchs, Free Movement of Services and Social Security-Quo Vadis?, 8 EuR. L.J.
536, 544 (2002).
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a case-by-case basis. This approach inevitably leads to the harmoniza-
tion of several aspects of the organization of national health care sys-
tems.
However, several points are not clarified in the case law on
cross-border health care. It is no surprise that the EU is about to harmon-
ize these matters on the basis of Treaty provisions such as Article 95 of
the EC. Matters to be covered are, in my view, patient information, defi-
nitions (e.g., what is hospital care), liability, and quality requirements.
Another important issue is connected with the problem that too much
movement of patients might result in the overburdening of some hospit-
als and corresponding under use of other hospitals. 95 In the case law, a
lot of attention is paid to the aspects of under use (financial equilibrium).
However, the question arises as to whether Member States are allowed to
prevent patients residing in other Member States from receiving medical
care in their hospitals if these hospitals are overburdened. It is clear from
the outset that such a policy would amount to restrictions of the free
movement of services (recipients of services would be hindered in the
exercise of their free movement rights). Therefore, whether such restric-
tions may be justified by an exception should be resolved soon. It is a
pity that the proposed Directive on patient mobility does not give much
guidance on this point.
A certain degree of harmonization is inevitable but the organiza-
tional basis structure of health care remains within the ambit of the pow-
ers of the Member States. To what extent a national health care system
is "vulnerable" to the application of EU law, depends on the way a par-
ticular Member States shapes and administers such a system, issues that
must be addressed include (1) How are waiting lists addressed? (2) What
is the role of planning? (3) How much room is left for competition?
From a patient's perspective, it could be argued that the ECJ case law
forces the national authorities to respect principles of good governance in
the management of the national health care system. The well-being of
patients must always be at the heart of Member States' policy. This con-
clusion is to be welcomed: health policy is essentially about curing ill
people.
Nevertheless, the steering capacity of the national authorities
must be respected. How to ensure an adequate balance between cross-
border health care and the powers of the Member States to organize and
deliver health care services is a difficult question. It is to be expected
'95 HERVEY & MCHALE, supra note 50, at 139.
Vol. 26, No. 3
HeinOnline  -- 26 Wis. Int'l L.J. 759 2008-2009
Wisconsin International Law Journal
that this question will be high on the ECJ's agenda in the coming years.
In this respect, it should be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon will change
Article 152 of the EC. In particular, Section 7 of this Treaty provision
will again stress that the EU should respect the competences of the
Member States to regulate the organization of health care. However,
compared to the present Treaty provision this section adds new elements
to the principles governing the relationship between the EU and the
Member States in the field of health care. It explicitly states that the re-
sponsibilities of the Member States ". . . shall include the management of
health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources as-
signed to them."'96 It is clear from these words that the emphasis is put
on the management of national health care and, therefore in the author's
view, also on the steering capacities of the Member States. Consequent-
ly, points of concern in the near future will be the observance of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity in national health care, and the planning of the na-
tional health care systems, which will remain a task of the Member
States. It is hoped that the proposed Directive on patient mobility will be
able to strike a good balance between the internal market and the national
organization of health care. Both the present version of Article 152(5) of
the EC and the new version of this provision, as amended by the Treaty
of Lisbon, do not preclude the EU legislature from adopting a Directive
on patient mobility. As long as this directive deals with medical services
that are services within the meaning of Article 49 of the EC, the EU has
the power to regulate patient mobility." 7 Such services are in principle
open to EU measures of harmonization taken on the basis of Article 95
of the EC.
In sum, it is time for the EU legislature to take action and to set
clear standards for reconciling the free movement of health services and
national measures in the health care sector. The incremental develop-
ment of health care cases by the ECJ is no longer capable of addressing
the challenges faced by the EU and the Member States. The EU legisla-
ture and the Member States must not shift the responsibility onto the
ECJ, but should start developing a clear framework for health care ser-
vices on their own.
196 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 1, at C 306/84 (amending Article 152 of TFEU by renumbering
paragraph 5 as paragraph 7 and stipulating that the measures taken by the EU may "not affect na-
tional provisions on the donation or medical use of organs and blood.").
197 See Derrick Wyatt, Community Competence to Regulate Medical Services, in SOCIAL WELFARE
AND EU LAW 131, 142-43 (Michael Dougan & Eleanor Spaventa, 2005).
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